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Historical Perspectives of the Anti-Federalists 
4 
The Anti-Federalists have received an interesting treatment from historians; 
sometimes condemned, sometimes acclaimed, sometimes trivialized, and other times 
ignored. They were the ostensive losers of the debate for ratification of the new 
constitution and as many other defeated groups have often experienced, the victors 
cast and directed the history of their successful campaign. Those who had identified 
themselves as "Federalist," designated their own opposition as "Anti-Federalist". The 
significance of this nomenclature, for the developed sense of historical irony, is that 
the Anti-Federalists, on the whole, supported a federal system of government, a 
system in which sovereign states form a confederation for defense and commerce; a 
federal system of States-United in the stead of a United States. It would have been 
closer to their true ideological positions if the Federalists were to have been known as 
''Nationalists", while the Anti-Federalists were to have been known as "Federalists". 
As Herbert Storing ( 1981 )  would point out, even the use of the Anti-Federalist 
designation used by historians betray a certain premises. 1 The nominal construction 
of"anti-federalist" would suggest a descriptive term, which would be inaccurate 
based upon the Anti-Federalists position in support of federalism. The construction 
of "anti-Federalist" would denote an undue dependence upon the "Federalist" term; it 
would cast the Anti-Federalists as the mere antithesis of the "Federalists". The 
construction used here and adopted and standardized by Storing, is a full 
capitalization of "Anti-Federalist" denoting a proper name but not necessarily a 
Herbert J .Storing, What the Anti-Federalists were For (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
198 1 ), 79. 
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descriptive one; just as a man named Abraham (Hebrew: "Father of a Multitude"), 
may in fact be childless. 
In a society's evaluation of its environmental change, often the slow progress 
of change can lead many residents to believe that the environment has always been 
what it is now because few are old enough to detect the significant accumulation of 
subtle changes over a long course of time. Jared Diamond describes this condition as 
"landscape amnesia" or "creeping normalcy". 2  The same condition can afflict our 
view of the past when surveying past historical landscapes. In that spirit, consider as 
a hypothetical, in this contemporary time, a special political convention were called 
by our Congress to revise the Constitution specifically to update its language for 
modem times and to help fix the current economic troubles of the country though 
adaptive powers to regulate commerce. Consider further that instead of an update of 
the language and a change to some Federal power to regulate commerce and contrary 
to the Congressional commission of the convention, that the convention had proposed 
a fundamentally different form of government from our present one, one that claims 
its laws superior to all prior laws and one that might abolish all state and local 
governments and consolidate these into one unitary government with no structural 
guarantee of individual rights. Furthermore, the convention proposed that the new 
unified Constitution would be ratified if accepted by two thirds of the state 
conventions and it would replace all national law prior to its creation. If this scenario 
appears at all problematic, you may then begin to sympathize with the Anti-
Federalists. 
Jared Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed. (New York: Penguin Group, 
2006), 425. 
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Perhaps this hypothetical may be claimed to be more severe than the one that 
the Anti-Federalists faced but it must have come as quite a shock that those entrusted 
with revising the Articles of Confederation, the same articles that would have seemed 
in their eyes to have been the hard-fought for fruits of the American Revolution, were 
to be hijacked by men intent on a completely new political invention. The pre-Anti-
Federalist reaction to such a revelation was that the Philadelphia Convention had 
over-stepped its bounds, that it went outside of the legal process formed and agreed to 
in the Articles of Confederation, that the proposed Constitution of the Philadelphia 
Convention was in fact, illegal. Many Anti-Federalists that were sent by their state 
delegations to the Convention, either refused to go, or else left after seeing the 
intended purposes of the Convention surpassed revision of the Articles of 
Confederation. Patrick Henry, one of the most famous Anti-Federalists was famously 
quoted as having, "smelt a rat" as his explanation for declining to attend the 
Philadelphia Convention. Robert Yates and John Lansing, two delegates from the 
state of New York, left in protest of the proceedings, citing that the convention lacked 
the authority to adopt, "a system of consolidated government. . .  which tend to deprive 
the state government of its most essential rights of sovereignty . . .  " and also that such 
a general government would, "be productive of the destruction of the civil 
liberties . . . . "3 
That so many of an Anti-Federalist disposition objected to the proceedings is 
not too extraordinary considering some of the content of the proceedings. Such 
references as this one, attributable to the Federalist, Alexander Hamilton during the 
Jonathan Elliot, ed., Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Constitution 
(Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co I 876), I :480-83. 
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Philadelphia Convention might have troubled any revolutionary patriot only recently 
removed from monarchy and aristocracy: 
All communities divide themselves into the few and the many. The first are 
the rich and the well-born; the other the mass of the people. The voice of the 
people has been said to be the voice of God; and however generally this 
maxim has been quoted and believed, it is not true in fact. The people are 
turbulent and changing; they seldom judge or determine right. Give therefore 
to the first class a distinct, permanent share in the Government. . . . Can a 
democratic assembly who annually resolve in the mass of the people be 
supposed steadily to pursue the public good? Nothing but a permanent body 
can check the imprudence of democracy. 4 
If Hamilton's Federalist sentiments for restraints on the "imprudence of democracy", 
seem as tending toward aristocratic elitism, compare the tenor of Hamilton's 
statement with judge Thomas Tredwell's Anti-Federalist reservations written for the 
New York ratification convention: 
In this Constitution, sir, we have departed widely from the principles and 
political faith of '76, when the spirit of liberty ran high, and danger put a curb 
on ambition. Here we find no security for the rights of individuals, no 
security for the existence of our state governments; here is no bill of rights, no 
proper restriction of power; our lives, our property, and our consciences, are 
left wholly at the mercy of the legislature, and the powers of the judiciary may 
be extended to any degree short of almighty. Sir, in this Constitution we have 
not only neglected, - we have done worse, - we have openly violated, our 
faith, - that is, our public faith. 5 
It is an interesting hypothetical to suppose how the Philadelphia Convention 
proceedings might have been different had the Anti-Federalists participated from the 
start but as will be seen, the Anti-Federalist reservations would not completely be in 
vam. 
Howard Zinn. A Peoples History of the United States: 1492-Present (New York Harper Perennial 
Modem Classics 2005), 96. A ful l  excerpt found in Appendix I: J .  Elliot, ed., Debates in the 
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Philadelphia: J.B. 
Lippincott & Co 1 876), 1 :Yates' Minutes, paragraph 3205. 
Elliot, ed., Debates in the Several State Conventions, 2: 40 1 .  
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Yet heretofore, the Anti-Federalists would not have been identified (self-
identified or otherwise) as such until after the Philadelphia Convention had completed 
its work and put forth its proposed Constitution for state ratification. It is in the 
debate within the several states, in various of public print forms that the Federalist 
and Anti-Federalist dialog that is most familiar, begins to unfold and it is within this 
sphere of the individual state ratification conventions that the Anti-Federalists begin 
to air their objections to the proposed Constitution. The Philadelphia Convention 
proceedings themselves were kept secret and guarded, so much so that the transcripts 
and records of the proceedings were not released to the pubic until 1 8 1 9, and 
Madison's notes of the proceedings not published until 1 840.6 
Historical interpretation of the role and character of the Anti-Federalists after 
the ratification of the Constitution until after the Civil War would be largely silent. 7* 
This response probably should not seem too surprising, for the issue could have easily 
lost the weight of its importance in the minds of its contemporaries. For 
commentators between the time of ratification until after the Civil War, the debate 
Vasan Kesavan and M ichael Stokes Paulsen. "The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret 
Drafting History," Georgetown Law Journal, (August 2003): 1 .  "A system of consolidation, has 
been formed with the most profound secrecy and without the least authority: And has been 
suddenly and without any previous notice transmitted by the federal convention for ratification -
Congress not disposed to give any opinion on the plan, have transmitted it to the legislatures - The 
legislatures have followed the example and sent it to the people. The people of this state, 
unassisted by Congress or their legislature, have not had time to investigate the subject, have 
referred to the newspapers for information, have been divided by contending writers, and under 
such circumstances have elected members for the state convention -and these members are to 
consider whether they will accept the plan of the federal convention, with all its imperfections, and 
bind the people by a system of government, of the nature and principles of which they have not at 
present a clearer idea than they have of the Copernican system." -The Massachusetts Centinel, 
January 2, 1 788. 
Cecilia Kenyon, "Men of Little Faith: The Anti-Federalists on the Nature of Representative 
Government," The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, 1 2, no. I (Jan 1 955): 5. See also 
James Hutson, "The Creation of the Constitution: Scholarship at a Standstill" Reviews in American 
History, 1 2, no. 4 (Dec., 1 984), 463. *For a Reference Summary o(Anti-Federa/ist Historiography_ 
see Table f. 
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may have seemed to be a closed issue, much as one no longer has need to shout 
"fire!" after all have been evacuated and fire-teams arrived. Nearly all parties were in 
accord that the Articles of Confederation could not be sustained in its original form 
and after the new Constitution had been successfully ratified and adopted, not much 
gain could be expected with further agitation. The initial objectors had eventually 
assimilated into the new system as the previous Anti-Federalists had accepted the new 
national Constitution and would eventually align themselves with Jefferson's 
Democratic-Republican party. 
Alternative to an explanatory theory for the silence of the Anti-Federalist 
comment in historical representation based on an amicable resolution of the issue, 
there is also the possibility that the Anti-Federalist complainants having been 
seemingly defeated by Hamilton, Madison and Jay under the pseudonym of "Publius" 
in the Federalist papers, may have so apparently won the day that their contemporary 
critics were considered inconsequential. 8 From this perspective, the Anti-Federalists 
were mere naysayers and supporters of the antiquated and impractical Articles of 
Confederation. For this era then, the perspective might be easily taken that the issue 
had been settled in the ratification and the test of whether the new system would be 
successful would have then begun. 
The period between ratification of the Constitution and the post-Civil War era 
was not completely silent however. Charles Beard in his Economic Interpretation of 
the Constitution projected that his own hypothesis, which will be detailed later, is 
reflected in some of the post-ratification Federalist historians such as Richard 
Kenyon, "Men of Little Faith": 5 .  "Perhaps because theirs was the losing side, the political 
thought of the Anti-Federalists has received much less attention than that of the Founding Fathers." 
1 0  
Hildreth ( 1 807 - 1865) and David Ramsay (1 749-1 8 1 5).9 David Ramsay ( 1 787) 
would give this assertion as to Anti-Federalist motives in his speech during the South 
Carolina's ratification convention: 
. . .  be on your guard against the misrepresentations of men who are involved in 
debt; such may wish to see the constitution rejected, . . .  [the Constitution] will 
doubtless bear hard on debtors who wish to defraud their creditors, but it will 
be of real service to the honest part of the community. Examine well the 
characters & circumstances of men who are averse to the new constitution. 
Perhaps you will fmd that the above recited clause is the real ground of the 
opposition of some of them, though they may artfully cover it with a splendid 
profession of zeal for state privileges and general liberty. 10 
John Marshall, to be later known as the famed Supreme Court Chief Justice 
in such cases as McCulloch v. Maryland ( 1 8 1 9), a noted Federalist and associate of 
Hamilton, made similar statement identifying the Federalists as largely representing 
mercantile-creditor interests and the Anti-Federalists as representing agrarian-debtor 
interests. 1 1 As Marshall understood the problems that gave rise to the necessity to call 
for the amendments to the Articles of Confederation, which ultimately led to the 
Philadelphia Convention: 
. . .  two great parties were formed in every state which were distinctly marked 
and which pursued distinct objects with systematic arrangement. The one 
struggled with unabated zeal for the exact observance of public and private 
engagements. By those belonging to it, the faith of a nation or Of a private 
man was deemed a sacred pledge, the violation of which was equally 
forbidden by the principles of moral justice and of sound policy. The 
distresses of individuals were, they thought, to be alleviated only by industry 
and frugality, not by a relaxation of the laws or by a sacrifice of the rights of 
James H. Hutson, "Country, Court and Constitution," The William and Mary Quarterly, 14, no. 3 
(198 1 ): 339. 
10 David Ramsay, "Civis: An Address to the Freemen of South Carolina on the Subject of the Federal 
Constitution": Friends of the Constitution: Writings of the "Other" Federalists, 1787-1788, edited 
by Colleen A. Sheehan and Gary L. McDowell (Indianapol is :  Liberty Fund, 1998). 
11 The truth or falsity of these claims aside, it should be noted that the assignment of a person or 
persons as "debtor" might well invoke in the minds of many of the period, of the infamous Shay's 
Rebel lion, which would have weighed heavy in the minds of many of the period as demonstrating 
the weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation and questioned the potential longevity of the 
Confederation. 
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others . They were consequently the uniform friends of a regular 
administration of justice, and of a vigorous course of taxation which would 
enable the state to comply with its engagements. By a natural association of 
ideas, they were also, with very few exceptions, in favour of enlarging the 
powers of the federal government. 12 
The first party to which Marshall refers, represents the position of the 
Federalists, of which along with Hamilton and Madison, Marshall concurred. The 
Federalists then, in Marshall's view, represented in some degree, creditor interests, 
and were proponents of strong, central government that would administer justice, and 
tax accordingly to pay off the national debt. Marshall continues his prior statement 
with the Anti-Federalists or the second party: 
The other party marked out for themselves a more indulgent course. Viewing 
with extreme tenderness the case of the debtor, their efforts were unceasingly 
directed to his relief. To exact a faithful compliance with contracts was, in 
their opinion, a harsh measure which the people would not bear. They were 
uniformly in favour of relaxing the administration of justice, of affording 
facilities for the payment of debts, or of suspending their collection, and of 
remitting taxes. The same course of opinion led them to resist every attempt 
to transfer from their own hands into those of congress powers which by 
others were deemed essential to the preservation of the union. In many of 
these states, the party last mentioned constituted a decided majority of the 
people, and in all of them it was very powerful. The emission of paper 
money, the delay of legal proceedings, and the suspension of the collection of 
taxes were the fruits of their rule wherever they were completely 
predominant. 13 
Marshall, far from an advocate of democracy, acknowledges or at least 
opinions, that the majority of the people would have sided with the Anti-Federalist 
position and that behind the ideological debate of ratification, what was at stake, 
according to Marshall, was the tensions of depreciation of currency and rising 
inflation between the creditors and the indebted.14 Marshall's interpretation ofthe 
11 John Marshall, Life of Washington, vol. I I  ( 1  850 ed.), 99. 
13 Ibid., 99. 
14 Cecelia Kenyon also indicates that, "A very large proportion of the people in 1 787- 1 788 were Anti­
Federalists, . . .  " Cecelia Kenyon, "Men of Little Faith": 5. "Had a vote been taken on the adoption 
1 2  
Federalist and Anti-Federalist debate as formed more by pragmatic economic interests 
and not the prima facia ideological commitments expressed in those debates. 15 
The thinking of historians after the Civil War begins to take on a new 
character. The nation having survived the fiery crucible, a new and revived patriotism 
arose and is well represented in Lincoln's Gettysburg Address : 
. . .  our fathers brought forth on this continent, a new nation, conceived in 
Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal. Now 
we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation 
so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure . . . .  It is rather for us to be 
here dedicated to the great task remaining before us . . .  that we here highly 
resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain -- that this nation, under 
God, shall have a new birth of freedom -- and that government of the people, 
by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth. 16 
Lincoln's historical perspective would become no aberration. W.E. Gladstone said 
that the Constitution was, "the most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by 
the brain and purpose ofman."17 In accordance with Gladstone, George Bancroft 
(1 882, the "father of American history") waxed not as eloquently as Lincoln but as 
sincerely of the Constitutional drafting: 
. . .  the [the people] had prepared a Constitution which, in the union of freedom 
with strength and order, excelled every one known before. . . . In the happy 
of the Constitution as soon as the convention assembled, there can be no question but that it would 
have been overwhelmingly against the proposed plan." -Harding, The Federal Constitution in 
Massachusetts, p. 67. 
15 Consider Chief Justice Marshall's nationalist stance in the majority opinion of McCulloch v. 
Maryland: "The government proceeds directly from the people; is 'ordained and established' in the 
name of the people and is declared to be ordained 'in order to form a more perfect union, to 
establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, and secure the blessings of liberty' to themselves and 
their posterity. The assent of the States, in their sovereign capacity, is implied in calling a 
convention, and thus submitting that instrument to the people. But the people were at perfect 
liberty to accept or reject it; and their act was final. . . .  The government of the union, then 
(whatever may be the influence of this fact on the case) is emphatically and truly a government of 
the people. In form and in substance it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and 
are to be exercised directly on them, and for their benefit. . . .  It is the government of all; its powers 
are delegated by al l; it represents all, and acts for all." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.  4 Wheat. 
3 1 6  ( 1 8 1 9). 
16 Roy P. Basler (ed.), Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, American Historical Review, ( 1 953). 
17 W. E. Gladstone, "Kin Beyond the Sea" North American Review, CXXVII ( 1 878): 1 85 .  
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morning of their existence as one ofthe powers ofthe world, they had chosen 
justice for their guide; and while they proceeded on their way with a well­
founded confidence and joy, all the friends of mankind invoked success on 
their endeavour as the only hope for renovating the life of the civilised 
world. 1 8  
James Hutson ( 198 1 )  comments that the historians of the post-Civil War era 
treated the Constitution with a kind of idolatry. 1 9 In large part, this new political 
climate heightened the sense that the Constitution had been perhaps divinely ordained 
and as a result the Anti-Federalists as those who represented its original opposition to 
it, became historically reviled. Charles Beard would attribute to professor Theodore 
Clarke Smith ( 1 870- 1 960) this rather mild view of post-Civil War historians: "Former 
historians had described the struggle over the formation and adoption of the document 
[the Constitution] as a contest between sections ending in a victory of straight-
thinking national-minded men over narrower and more local opponents."20 A more 
severe response to the Anti-Federalists can be found in Hermann von Holst's 
comment on the Anti-Federalists: 
All moderation, all reason, seemed to forsake them [the Anti-Federalists]. . . .  
The most fanatical assumed the lead; men for whom no weapon was too blunt 
or brutal so long as they could use it. Their arguments bordered on the 
extremest absurdity and their assumptions might have excited the loudest 
merriment, were it not that the question was one of life or death to the 
nation.21 
Hutson identifies this condemnation of the Anti-Federalists as resulting from 
their association with the advocates of the states' rights of secession due to Anti-
Federalist fears of centralized power, and more importantly, claims Hutson, as friends 
18 George Bancroft, History of the Constitution ( 1 882 ed.) Vol .  Il, 367. [See also p. 44 1 ]  
19 Hutson, "Country, Court and Constitution": 342. 
2° Charles Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (New York: 
The Free Press, 1 9 1 3), vii. 
21  Hermann von Holst 1 876, "The Anti-Federalists, 1 78 1 - 1 789" Wisconsin Magazine of History, 
XLVI ( 1 962- 1 963), 2 1 4 .  
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of paper money, became associated with the Greenbackers. 22 The faith in the union or 
nation having been revived by its survival from civil strife being the cause of or at 
least rising at the same time with the idolatry of the Constitution and its founding, led 
to a picture of the Anti-Federalists as true devils, men opposed to a sacred document 
and a sacred nation for reasons of stupidity, greed and/or duplicity. 23 
It was in this climate that Charles Beard wrote his controversial book, An 
Economic Interpretation of the Constitution (1913). Beard claimed to have been 
impressed by the "philosophy of politics" put forward by James Madison in Federalist 
10, the writings John Marshall and the historian Richard Hildreth in their, "mental 
picture of the Constitution those realistic features of economic conflict, stress, and 
strain" in which a, "struggle [of] an alignment of economic interests had taken place," 
which would be left out of post-Civil War era historians concentration on juristic 
issues.24 Beard's economic interpretation was controversial but not unprecedented in 
his time. Charles E Merriam (1903) had earlier characterized the Constitution as, 
"Conservative, even reactionary", while J. Allen Smith (1907) portrayed the 
Constitution as a conspiracy of the, "wealthy and conservative classes". 25 Beard 
rejoined that while, "economic elements [as] the chief factors in the development of 
22 Hutson, "Country, Court and Constitution": 341 .  
23 Edward P. Smith ( 1 889), quoting Friedrich von Schiller, said referring to the Anti-Federalists, 
"Against stupidity, the gods themselves fight in vain." Found in: "Movement Towards a Second 
Convention," in Jameson, ed. ,  Essays in Constitutional History, 73 . 
24 Beard, Economic Interpretation of the Constitution, vi, vii, viii. " . . .  during the closing years of the 
nineteenth century this realistic view of the Constitution had been largely submerged in abstract 
discussions of states' rights and national sovereignty and in formal, logical, and discriminative 
analyses of judicial opinions. It was admitted, of course, that there had been a bitter conflict over 
formation and adoption of the Constitution; but the struggle was usually explained, if explained at 
all, by reference to the fact that some men cherished states' rights and others favoured a strong 
central government." - Charles Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United 
States (New York: The Free Press, 1 9 1 3) vi &vii. 
25 Hutson, "Country, Court and Constitution": 342. 
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political institutions . . .  [had been] . .. used in one or two serious works . . .  [it] . . .  has not 
been applied to the study of American history at large."26 
Beard's thesis is that the among the "chief factors" of the ideology and 
policies supported by g�oups like the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists were in 
whole or in part determined by their economic background. Beard then applying this 
thesis with support of evidence of economic backgrounds he collects, concludes that 
the Federalists were conservative counter-revolutionaries who proposed the 
Constitution to protect moneyed and commercial interests, while the Anti-Federalists 
responded to the Constitution to thwart the Federalist agenda and uphold landed and 
agrarian interests. Beard's analysis is significant for the Anti-Federalists because his 
is the first significant positive historical comment that the Anti-Federalists had yet 
received and this brought about an interest in their serious study, whether to dispute 
or confirm Beard's thesis. 
Beard identified the Federalists as holders of what he called "personalty", 
representing, "money, public securities, manufactures, and trade and shipping". 27 
Beard's assertion of the Federalist position would seem to harmonize with what may 
be inferred from the statements of the Federalists, Marshall and Ramsey already 
noted; both men would contend that the Anti-Federalist's secret or hidden motivations 
were based upon their interests as debtors and that the Constitution would support the 
interests of creditors. Similarly, Beard infers a secret or hidden motivation within the 
Federalists, "Under the circumstances the framers of the Constitution relied, not upon 
direct economic qualification, but upon checks and balances to secure the rights of 
26 Beard, Economic interpretation of the Constitution, 6. 
27 Beard, Economic interpretation of the Constitution, 29 1 ,  324, 325. 
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property - particularly personal property - against the assaults of the farmers and the 
proletariat."28 For Beard, the Federalists become a group aligned under certain 
economic interests, who were generally advocates of "commercial regulations 
advantageous to personalty operations in shipping and manufacturing and in western 
land speculations. "29 
In his "Impressions As To The New Constitution", Hamilton's statement is 
telling of Federalist sentiment, " . . .  men of property in the several states who wish a 
government of the Union able to protect them against domestic violence and the 
depredations which the democratic spirit is apt to make on property."30 In Beard's 
analysis the Federalist perspective representing personalty took on a decidedly 
aristocratic and anti-democratic spirit, which many historians had previously ignored. 
Beard points to such evidence as the letter of"Civis", published in the Maryland 
Journal on March 21 •t, 1788, to demonstrate Federalist aristocratic sentiment: 
Choose no man in debt, because being in debt proves that he wanted 
understanding to take care of his own affairs . . . .  A man in debt can scarcely be 
honest. ... Vote for no man who was in favour of paper money, for no honest 
man was for that measure. None but debtors and desperate wretches 
advocated the diabolical scheme . . . .  Elect no man who supported the law 
allowing insolvent debtors to discharge their persons from perpetual 
imprisonment, by honestly delivering up all their property to the use of their 
creditors. The legislature have no right to interfere with private contracts, and 
debtors might safely trust to the humanity and clemency of their creditors who 
28 Charles Beard, The Economic Basis of Politics (New York: 1 922), 66-67. 
29 Beard, Economic interpretation of the Constitution, 50. Western land speculations being 
investments of personalty rather than landed realty. Statements such as Hugh Williamson's, as a 
Federalist and a member of the Convention from North Carolina, demonstrates the thrust of Beard's 
interpretive analysis, in which people may think or say they act upon ideological principles, when 
in fact, they are led by personal economic interests, "For myself, I conceive that my opinions are 
not biased by private Interests but having claims to a considerable Quantity of Land in the Western 
Country, I am fully persuaded that the Value of those Lands must be increased by an efficient 
federal Government." 
30 Alexander Hamilton "Impressions As To The New Constitution" 1 787. The Works of Alexander 
Hamilton, ed. Henry Cabot Lodge (Federal Edition) (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1904). Vol. 
I,. 
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will not keep them in gaol all their lives, unless they deserve it. . . .  Men of 
great property are deeply interested in the welfare of the state; and they are the 
most competent judges of the form of government, best calculated to preserve 
their property, and such liberties as it is proper for the common and inferior 
class of people to enjoy. Men of wealth possess natural and acquired 
understanding, as they manifest by amassing riches, or by keeping and 
increasing those they derive from their ancestors, and they are best acquainted 
with the wants, the wishes, and desires of the people, and they are always 
ready to relieve them in their private and public stations."31 
It is in Beard's economic interpretation that the Anti-Federalists would find 
positive publicity. Heretofore the Federalists had inherited the veneration of 
historians and the title of "founding fathers". From the perspective of those in the 
first quarter of the twentieth century within the burgeoning Populist and Progressive 
Movements, Beard's suggestion that the Federalists represented commercial interests 
and creditors would be jarring if not profane. Beard's work was not a complete 
defamation however, a new set of stylized heroes could be gleaned from Beard's 
interpretative analysis, the Anti-Federalists. 32 
Beard identified the opposition to the Constitution as stemming from the 
democratic, agrarian and landed interests; or what he termed "realty" or landed 
interests. The great Anti-Federalist, Patrick Henry would seemingly anticipate 
Beard's identification of small farmers as the opponents of the Constitution, when 
during the Virginia Convention, he was reported to say, 
"I believe it to be a fact, that the great body of yeomanry are in 
decided opposition to it. I may say with confidence that, for nineteen counties 
adjacent to each other, nine-tenths of the people are conscientiously opposed 
to it. . . .  You have not solid reality - the hearts and hands of the men who are 
to be governed. "33 
31 Beard, Economic interpretation of the Constitution, 317-318. 
32 The Populist and Progressive movements in 1913 were interested, "in reforming the structure of 
the national government to make it more democratic." Kenyon, "Men of Little Faith": 5. 
33 Elliot, vol. Ill. p. 592. 
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These interests represented the majority of the people but they also consisted of the 
least represented people. While the interests of commerce, money and securities had 
centralized population centers in eastern, coastal cities with methods of public 
communication and easy interaction, the landed agrarian interests were separated by 
distances and had such little direct intercourse that it was difficult for their interests, 
while demographically much greater, to coalesce into solidarity. Beard would note 
that as the ratification conventions were largely held in urban centers of Federalist 
control, the difficulties of travel to polls from the outlying counties and additionally, 
the fmancial status of small farmers and debtors stood as a impediment to financing a 
public campaign opposing the Constitution, while Federalist interests often controlled 
the newspapers and presses. 34 If the conspiracy of economic interests still seems 
untenable to a contemporary historian, consider this letter from "Cornelius" ( 1 787) of 
Massachusetts : 
I wish, there never might be any competition between the landed and the 
mercantile interests, nor between any different classes of men whatever. . . .  
The citizens in the seaport towns are numerous; they live compact; their 
interests are one; there is a constant connection . . .  between them; they can, on 
any occasion, centre their votes where they please. This is not the case with 
those who are in the landed interest; they are scattered far and wide; they have 
but little intercourse and connection with each other. . . .I conceive a 
foundation is laid for throwing the whole power of the federal government 
into the hands of those who are in the mercantile interest; and for the landed, 
which is the great interest at of this country, to lie unrepresented, forlorn, and 
without hope. It grieves me to suggest an idea of this kind: But I believe it to 
be important and not the mere phantom of imagination, or the result of an 
uneasy and restless disposition.35 
34 Beard, Economic Interpretation of the Constitution, 252. 
35 Charles Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (New York: 
The Free Press, 1 9 1 3) 305-306. 
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The disposition of historians sympathetic to Beard in the beginning ofthe 201h century 
found the association of Federalists with aristocratic capitalists in conflict with their 
prior high esteem for the Federalists and created a less sympathetic image of the 
Constitutional drafting. 
Beard contends that the recognition of the economic interests at stake were not 
lost on either the Federalists or the Anti-Federalists. Rufus King in a letter to 
Madison in 1788, complained of the Anti-Federalist sentiment to the opposition of the 
Constitution as founded in their fears of aristocracy: 
Apprehension that the liberties of the people are in danger, and a distrust of 
men of property or education have a more powerful effect upon the minds of 
our opponents than any specific objections against the Constitution . . . .  The 
opposition complains that the lawyers, judges, clergymen, merchants, and 
men of education are all in favour of the Constitution - and for that reason 
they appear to be able to make the worse appear the better cause. 36 
Beard's thesis was highly controversial, as Beard was reproached for having 
"accused the members of the Convention of working merely for their own pockets" 
and that his purported theory of economic determinism did not stand up to rigorous 
analysis.37 Beard answered to his critics that his theory is not stolidly deterministic, 
but that economic considerations should be ignored at the peril of the historians' 
integrity. 38 Beard allowed for historical actors "the guidance of abstract principles of 
political science" beyond mere personal interests but he cautioned that many times 
what appeared to be ostensible ideological issues, can often be found to have a 
36 Ibid., 304. 
37 Ibid., xvi. 
38 "I have never been able to discover all pervading determinism in history . . . .  Nevertheless, whoever 
leaves economic pressures out of history or out of the discussion of public questions is in mortal 
peril of substituting mythology for reality and confusing issues instead of clarifying them . . . .  By 
refusing to do this we become victims of history - clay in the hands of its makers." Ibid., xvi. 
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economic underpinning.39 Still, Beard's work would become very popular with 
progressive historians for several decades; as cited in Kenyon (1955), Maurice 
Blinkoff ( 1936) would conduct a study of college history textbooks for his The 
Influence of Charles A. Beard upon American Historiography, in which he would say 
that Beard's interpretation would be taken up by those same textbooks with, "virtual 
unanimity". 40 
Cecelia Kenyon ( 1955) would later oppose Beard's ( 19 13) interpretation of 
the Anti-Federalists in her article "Men of Little Faith". Kenyon represented a new 
wave of historical interpretation, designated as "consensus history," that was coming 
into strength as the progressive histories had begun to weaken under rigorous 
historical analysis. The new consensus history emphasized the homogeneity of 
historical factions. Kenyon would stress the, "essential unity of the Federalists and 
Anti-Federalists," as, "they shared a large body of political ideas and attitudes, 
together with a common heritage of political institutions."41 In this spirit, Kenyon 
proposed that the Anti-Federalists were not as different from the Federalists in their 
political views and economic interests as suggested by Beard; they differed only in 
degree of sentiment, not as a divergence in class or economic interests. 42 Kenyon's 
theory held that the Anti-Federalists held true ideological objections, even if these 
39 Ibid., 73. 
4° Kenyon, "Men of Little Faith": 4. *Kenyon would go on to note that she did not think the same 
could be said of college history textbooks in her own time. 
41 Hutson, "Country, Court, and Constitution": 347; Kenyon, " Men of Little Faith": 37-38.  
42 "It would seem to be very clear, that the factors that united the Federalists and Anti-Federalists 
were stronger than those that divided them." Cecilia Kenyon, ed., The Antifederalists, 
{Indianapolis: 1 966) xcvii. 
Beard's unwillingness or failure to rigorously define his thesis makes it difficult to label him as a 
categorical economic determinist. Certainly, many of the progressive historians to follow Beard 
did take this direction, while Beard himself would later deny any monistic theory of causation. 
(Kenyon, "Men of Little Faith": 3) 
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may have been largely polemical, to the Constitution rather than the personal and 
economic interests ofBeard but those objections were based upon fears of potential 
abuses of powers, fears that the Federalists had shared. The difference between the 
two groups amounted to the subtle distinction that while the Federalists thought that 
they had engaged the problem of potential abuses of power and had rectified these by 
adequate separations of power with checks and balances, the Anti-Federalists had 
thought the Federalist efforts were not enough to secure the prevention of tyranny and 
despotism. 
Kenyon asserts that the influence of the political writings ofMontesquieu, in 
the Anti-Federalist esteem ofMontesquieu, was a significant central impediment to 
their solidarity with the Federalists. 43 Kenyon's assertion aside, Montesquieu was 
quite influential with many Federalists as well, notably, Alexander Hamilton and 
James Madison.44 The writings ofMontesquieu would provide much credence to the 
fears of the potential for despotism within the proposed national government. The 
sticking point for many of the Anti-Federalists, was Montesquieu's argument that for 
a republic to "long subsist", it must necessarily have "only a small territory", for in 
republics of extensive size, a natural aristocracy or oligarchy will arise which will 
seek their own prosperity by "oppressing [their] fellow-citizens.45 The problem of a 
43 Kenyon, " Men of Little Faith:" 6. 
44 Melvin Richter, Montesquieu: Selected Political Writings {lndianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1 990), 1 .  "Opponents . . .  have with great assiduity cited and circulated the observations 
ofMontesquieu on the necessity of a contracted territory for a republican government. But they 
seem not to have been apprised of the sentiments of that great mean in another part of his work."­
Hamilton; "The oracle who is always consulted and cited upon this point is the celebrated 
Montesquieu . . . .  Let us endeavor in the first place to ascertain his meaning on this point."­
Madison. 
45 Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, The Complete Works of M. de Montesquieu 
(London: T. Evans, 1 777), 4 vols. Vol. 1 .  Chapter: CHAP. XVI.: Distinctive Properties of a 
Republic, paragraph 934. For a larger excerpt of Montesquieu concerning these attributions, see 
Appendix II 
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large republic is compounded by the colonial experience in local and "colony-sized" 
governments which represented a relatively homogeneous population of cultural and 
economic interests and in Montesquieu 's approbation of local government. 46 This 
argument was used by the Anti-Federalists to oppose what they perceived as the 
construction of an extensive republic in the federal government of the proposed 
Constitution. 
The Anti-Federalists, according to Kenyon, used the established political 
thinking of their time and corroborated this with their political experience in the 
colonies, and then the states, to make arguments that the new national system 
proposed by the framers of the Constitution would fundamentally change the quality 
of representation to which they were accustomed and this they argued was a reason to 
have great reservations regarding the new national government. Kenyon however, 
would typify these reservations as a psychological fear. The Anti-Federalists, in 
Kenyon's view, were motivated by their fear of despotism, aristocracy, loss of 
government interests in local economic and cultural interests and values, and loss of 
personal and direct contact with and knowledge of their representatives. All of these 
fears, according to Kenyon, stem from a more basic mistrust of human nature. While 
Montesquieu would associate honor with monarchies, fear with despotism, and virtue 
with republics, Kenyon argued that the reason for Anti-Federalist reservations was a 
lack of confidence in the basic virtue of other citizens, far removed from themselves, 
to govern with wisdom and in respect for the liberty of individuals. 
46 Kenyon, "Men of Little Faith": 6. "The inhabitants of a particular town are much better 
acquainted with its wants and interests than with those of other places; and are better judges of the 
capacity of their neighbours than of that of the rest of their countrymen .. " Montesquieu, Complete 
Works, Vol. l. Chap. Vi.: paragraph 1 200. 
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The Federalists would have similar fears regarding basic human nature, 
namely that the primary motivation for most individuals is self-interest, and this is 
why they had incorporated Montesquieu's separation of powers with a system of 
checks and balances. Such a sentiment comes to mind in the speech of Benjamin 
Franklin, given to the Constitutional Convention on Monday September l71h 1787, 
after hearing the objections of : 
"In these sentiments, Sir, I agree to this Constitution with all its faults, 
if they are such; because I think a general Government necessary for us, and 
there is no form of Government but what may be a blessing to the people if 
well administered, and believe farther that this is likely to be well 
administered for a course of years . . . .  I doubt too whether any other 
Convention we can obtain may be able to make a better Constitution. For 
when you assemble a number of men to have the advantage oftheir joint 
wisdom, you inevitably assemble with those men, all their prejudices, their 
passions, their errors of opinion, their local interests, and their selfish views. 
From such an Assembly can a perfect production be expected? It therefore 
astonishes me, Sir, to find this system approaching so near to perfection as it 
does; . . .  Thus I consent, Sir, to this Constitution because I expect no better . . .  
Much of the strength & efficiency of any Government in procuring and 
securing happiness to the people, depends, on the general opinion of the 
goodness of the Government, as well as well as of the wisdom and integrity of 
its Governors.47 
As Kenyon would have it, it was not so much that the Federalists had a 
different set of ideological premises for reservations concerning the new Constitution 
from the Anti-Federalists, but that their evaluation of whether these reservations had 
been properly met became the issue. In Kenyon's evaluation, the Federalists had a 
basic confidence in the virtue of the administrators of government and failing their 
virtue, the separation of powers with the proposed checks and balances and the 
occasional check of the people's confidence in elections would supply adequate 
47 Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, ed. Max Farrand (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1 9 1 1 ). Vol. 2. Chapter: MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 1787. paragraph 4864. 
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appeal to self-interest to maintain the republic. A statement of Kenyon's picture of 
the Federalist confidence in human nature balanced by their realism of the pursuit of 
self-interest or ambition can be seen in Madison's declaration in essay 51 of the 
Federalist, 
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition . . . .  But what is government 
itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, 
no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither 
external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing 
a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great 
difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the 
governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the 
people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience 
has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. 48 
As can been seen from the title, Kenyon asserts in her final evaluation, that the 
Anti-federalists were, "men of little faith". For Kenyon, the Anti-Federalists were 
negative in their outlook of human nature, excited in their vision and creativity for the 
potential abuses of power and largely motivated by fear of such abuses. Kenyon 
assigns to the Anti-Federalists various fears; fears of: centralization of power, of far 
distant localities affecting local political policy, despotism, aristocracy, demagogues, 
corrupt officials, any blending of branches of government, any clause of the 
Constitution found to be elastic or indeterminate that might possibly result in 
unchecked abuses of power by creative legislation however remote, usurpation of 
governmental power by foreign religious influences (Roman Catholics, "Jews", 
"Mahometans" and pagans, variously), and generally any power of government with 
the potential to be destructive of liberty. 49 This list could be made much longer but 
48 David Mootton, ed., The Essential Federalist and Anti-Federalist Papers. (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 2003), 243 . 
49 Kenyon, "Men of Little Faith": 30. "The Anti-Federalists probed the Constitution for ever 
conceivable treat, explicit or implicit, to their conception of free and popular government." 
25 
the general theme is not missed. Kenyon's assessment is reflected in Anti-Federalist 
caution or lack of "faith and vision" in the adoption of a national government. 50 
Where Beard would suggest that the Anti-Federalists were the more 
democratic of the two, Kenyon would point out that the Anti-Federalist fears of 
potential abuses of powers would lead to "more checks and balances [of power], not 
fewer". 51 Kenyon would conclude that, "the Anti-Federalists were not latter-day 
democrats. Least of all were they majoritarians with respect to the national 
government. . . .  The last thing in the world they wanted was a national democracy 
which would permit Congressional majorities to operate freely and without 
restraint."52 Thus, the Anti-Federalists were not to be framed as the radical and liberal 
defenders of democracy against the conservative aristocracy of the Federalists as 
presented in Beard, instead they were, "men of little faith" that had not the courage or 
faith to trust elections to secure liberty against Congressional tyranny. For Kenyon, 
the Anti-Federalists were the true conservatives protecting their small republics in the 
form of the states and the more radical Federalists represented a grander vision of a 
national government was, "far more advanced than their opponents". 53 
In 198 1 ,  the Anti-Federalists would be revived again to challenge Kenyon's 
view by James Hutson and Herbert Storing. As Hutson reviewed the uneasy dispute 
between the Consensus and Progressive interpretations of the Anti-Federalists, he 
agreed that while the Federalists and Anti-Federalists were very similar, the sheer 
amount of material in which they expressed their differences reduced the strength of 
50 Ibid.: 43. 
51 Ibid.: 43. 
52 Ibid.: 42-43. 
53 Ibid.: 39. 
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the Consensus historians' interpretation. At the same time, the Consensus criticism of 
the Progressives' distinction of competition between distinction economic groups 
warranted a need for historians to recapture the, "essence of those differences with 
appropriate terminology". 54 Hutson thought that the Anti-Federalists and Federalists 
could be taxonomically separated by an alternate terminology used by English 
politics to more accurately describe their differences. For this Hutson proposed to use 
the distinction of "Court" which represented the, "'collective designation of the 
monarch, his residence, council, officials, and courtiers"' and "Country", which 
represented the countryside and expressed as a general "opposition to the exercise of 
government power".55 Hutson believed that this revised terminology would more 
accurately describe the dispute between the Federalists (Court) and Anti-Federalists 
(Country). Hutson would agree with Kenyon that the Anti-Federalists should not be 
associated with democracy but that their dispute with the Federalists was not a mere 
lack of faith but a deeply rooted fear of centralized government power that they had 
inherited from the Whigs and transmitted through Trenchard, Gordon, and Burgh. 
At the same time that Hutson was attempting to mediate the conflict between 
the Consensus and Progressive historical interpretations by his revised terminology, 
Herbert J. Storing ( 198 1 )  published his own response to the Consensus historians. 
Storing in an extraordinary effort to frame the entire ratification debates over the 
Constitution, would gather a collection of Anti-Federalist writings in a seven volume 
set titled The Complete Anti-Federalist. Sadly, Storing would pass away before the 
54 Hutson, "Country, Court, and Constitution": 356. 
55 Hutson, "Country, Court, and Constitution": 356-357. Hutson notes that these definition of terms 
would remain valid from Charles I 's reign until the Glorious Revolution. 
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completion of his entire project but in addition to the collection of primary source 
material, his essay as a preface to the set, "What the Anti-Federalists were FOR" 
attempts to express the positive political ideologies of the Anti-Federalists as they 
would have understood them. While Storing himself would admit, the "Anti-
Federalists were primarily against the Constitution" they, "understood their negative 
conclusions about the Constitution to be derived from a positive political theory or set 
of political principles. "56 
In a nod to Kenyon, Storing would acknowledge that Federalist, " . . .  
reservations are scarcely distinguishable from Anti-Federal objections," but that in 
what the Consensus historians had erred was that the emphasis should not have been 
to what was, "common so much as for what isfundamenta/."57 Storing presented the 
Anti-Federalists as standing for an ideology of federalism as representing the states as 
the primary unit of political power, equal to each other in their confederation but that 
by the time of ratification, the use of the term "federalism" had "acquired a specific 
ambiguity that enabled the Federalists to not merely take but keep the name". 58 The 
ambiguity of "federalism" arose from the distinction of whether any particular 
increase in federal power would in fact violate the basic federal principle. This for 
Storing would be the crux of the contention; the Anti-Federalist would claim 
generally that many of the proposed increases in federal power would reduce the 
independent status of the states, while the Federalists denied such a violation of 
principle. 
56 Herbert J .Storing, What the Anti-Federalists were For (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1 98 1 ), 5 .  (Italics original.) 
57 Ibid., 5, 6. (Italics original.) 
58 Ibid, 9. 
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Storing would agree with Kenyon that the Anti-Federalists were strongly 
influenced by the thoughts ofMontesquieu in their advocacy of small republics of 
homogenous populations but that they also desired a union of the states. Patrick 
Henry would express this sentiment succinctly on behalf of the Anti-Federalists on 
June 5, 1 788, in the Virginia Convention, "The first thing I have at heart is American 
liberty: the second thing is American union . . . . "59 The problem that Storing attributes 
to the Anti-Federalists were in their perception of a unified government given such 
broad and potentially expansive grants of power as identified in the "supremacy" and 
"necessary and proper" clauses of the Constitution amounted to, "an unlimited grant 
of power to the general government to do whatever it might choose to do."60 Storing 
contends that the ambiguous and elastic nature of these clauses had for the Anti-
Federalists, "endless possibilities of usurpation and tyranny". 61 
Yet it would be this ambiguity that would lead the Anti-Federalists to their 
defeat according to Storing. The Anti-Federalists were committed both to the union 
and to the states, "to both the great American republic and the small, self-governing 
community . . .  " and due to this, they were subject to Hamilton's charge of trying to 
"reconcile contradictions".62 Thus, Storing charges that the Anti-Federalists as having 
the "weaker argument" in their simultaneous desire both to provide for local self-
control, independent states and a unified limited federal government; they could not 
bring themselves to completely reject a unified government for they acknowledged 
59 Jonathon Elliot,. (ed.). 1 876. Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the 
Federal Constitution. Philadelphia: J .B. Lippincott & Co. 3 : 1 23 .  
60 .Storing, What the Anti-Federalists were For, 28.  
6 1  Ibid., 28. · 
62 Ibid., 6.; Alexander Hamilton, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, ed. Henry Cabot Lodge (New 
York: G.P. Putnam 's Sons, 1 904). Vol. I I .  Chapter: From the New York Packet, Tuesday, December 
18, 1787 the federalist. no. xxiii ( hamilton ) To the People of the State of New York, 450. 
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that this would bring anarchy amongst the states. The Anti-Federalist ideology in 
Storing's view, batted back and forth against their distain for anarchy and their fears 
of despotism; they could rarely be satisfied with the compromises of the Federalists 
that to them seemed to be too far to one extreme or the other. 63 
Even with such a final evaluation, Storing provides the Anti-Federalists with 
perhaps their most noble attribution; as Storing says, the Anti-Federalists "contributed 
to the dialogue of the American founding" and thus are, "entitled . . .  to be counted 
among the Founding Fathers".64 While the Federalists were in general agreement that 
the proposed Bill of Rights would not be necessary in such a federal system, it would 
be the Anti-Federalist reservations to the Constitution that would instill the demand 
for a Bill of Rights and this would be the Anti-Federalists ' great legacy. 65 Storing's 
great commendation of the Anti-Federalists would be this :  "If, however, the 
foundation ofthe American polity was laid by the Federalists, the Anti-Federalist 
63 
64 
65 
" . . .  they were generally the same men who now wish to save us from the distractions of anarchy on 
the one hand, and the jaws of tyranny on the other" -Paul Leicester Ford, Pamphlets on the 
Constitution of the United States, published during its Discussion by the People, 1787-1788, 
(Brooklyn, N.Y., 1 888). Chapter: Gerry, Eldridge. Observations On the new Constitution, and on 
the Federal and State Conventions By a Columbian Patriot. Sic transit gloria Americana. [Boston: 
1788.], 1 7. ;  "The general government . . .  must very soon destroy all elective governments in the 
country, produce anarchy, or establish despotism." ibid. Chapter: Lee, Richard Henry. Observation 
leading to a fair examination of the system of government, proposed by the late Convention; and 
to several essential and necessary alterations in it. I In a number of Letters from the Federal 
Farmer to, 829. 
Storing, What the Anti-Federalists were For, 3 .  
"some Federalists . . .  contended that a b i l l  of  rights was not necessary because the Constitution 
was a compact not between individuals but between sovereign and independent societies.", Ibid., 
65.; "It is obviously impracticable, in the federal government of these states, to secure all rights of 
independent sovereignty to each, and yet provide for the interest and safety of all. Individuals 
entering into society must give up a share of liberty to preserve the rest. The magnitude of the 
sacrifice must depend as well on situation and circumstance, as on the object to be obtained. It is at 
all times difficult to draw with precision the line between those rights which must be surrendered, 
and those which may be reserved . . .  ", Jonathan Elliot, The debates in the several state conventions 
on the adoption of the federal Constitution, as recommended by the general convention at 
Philadelphia, in 1787 . . Chapter: CONSTITUTION, 1 52 .  
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reservations echo through American history; and it is in the dialogue, not merely in 
the Federalist victory, that the country's principles are to be discovered."66 
Of the more recent treatments of the Anti-Federalists, Christopher M. Duncan 
( 1994) takes up his case directly with Kenyon. Duncan would claim that the Anti-
Federalists were fundamentally, "Men of a Different Faith" rather than Kenyon's 
"Men of Little Faith". Duncan believes that when the Anti-Federalists are viewed 
through their ideals or values of public happiness, local communities and state 
sovereignty, the necessity of their opposing the Constitution becomes clear. Duncan 
suggests that Republicanism as the priority of the local community and local form of 
public association and participation was, "the primary language of American political 
discourse throughout the early life of the country. "67 
It is just this sense of Republicanism which Duncan believes contributed in 
early American politics to what he terms as "public happiness" which is the ability to 
participate in public matters. Duncan's view is that many other historians have 
associated "public happiness" with private property, wealth or personal satisfaction 
and that statements as to the "general welfare" are not early prescription for social 
policy but rather instructions for self-government. Duncan would invoke Arendt to 
read Jefferson's "pursuit of happiness" as consisting in the, "citizen's right of access 
to the public realm, in his share of public power - to be participator in the 
government of affairs . . .  even against public power. "68 It is then the centralization of 
power which the Anti-Federalists despised most because in that centralization was a 
66 Storing, What the Anti-Federalists were For, 72 . 
67 Christopher M. Duncan, "Men of a Different Faith: The Anti-Federalist Ideal in Early American 
Political Thought," Polity, 26, no. 3 { 1 994): 392. 
6K Ibid.: 394. (Interestingly, a very Aristotelian reading) 
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reduction in number of citizens who might participate and hence act in the public 
sphere. 
In Duncan's general theoretical model of the Anti-Federalist position, it was 
not the "collective fear of government or extra-libertarian impulses" of Kenyon and 
Storing, but "corrupt or detached govemment".69 Whereas the Federalists might have 
seen the state as prior to the individual outside of a "state of nature"70, and prior 
historians might have assigned the Anti-Federalists as seeing the individual as prior to 
the state; Duncan agues that more appropriately, the Anti-Federalists saw the 
community as being prior to both the individual and the state. As the Federalists 
would have attempted to replace the community with the nation, the Anti-Federalists 
would have seen this as a theoretical with the context of republicanism because of its, 
"emphasis on both extensive citizen participation in the construction and care of the 
public sphere and of the shared values and mores that enable such an endeavor in the 
first place".71 
Duncan's theory is more subtle than most and difficult to understand because 
of the basic presupposition the reader might have as an inheritor of a tradition of 
nationalism so perhaps it would be best to consider another hypothetical. If China 
was to be divided into 1 00 independent territories with equal populations, which all 
were applied for statehood within the United States and were approved by Congress 
for annexation, the political ramifications for the pre-annexation Americans might 
well be quite severe. Each annexed territory of China would have a greater 
69 Ibid. : 396. 
70 As a political concept most notably referred to in Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Hume. 
7 1  Ibid. :  397. 
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population base than any other State, with the exceptions of California, Texas, New 
York and Florida. The combined influence of the new Chinese states would be such 
that they, if unified, could easily select the next President, their interests would 
dominate the House of Representatives and as one hundred states, they would also 
have a two thirds majority of the Senate. Essentially all federal power would 
eventually transfer into the hands of a different people, far removed in distance and 
culture. How might, a pre-annexation American, feel about this change in the 
national government? The displeasure that a pre-annexation American might feel at 
this turn of events is what Duncan attributes to the Anti-Federalists; that their 
individual ability to act politically would be swallowed up by people far distant with 
different values and mores. Under this scenario, pre-annexation American self-
government would be fundamentally destroyed. 
Similarly, the thrust of Duncan's argument and theory is that the Anti-
Federalists saw in the Constitution, a centralization of power, which would reduce the 
public happiness, diminish local communities and fundamentally damage state 
sovereignty. For Duncan, this is why the Anti-Federalists would be found to bemoan 
standing armies, expanded bureaucracies and powers of taxation. For as Duncan 
cites, "free people were not those who were merely spared actual oppression, but 
those who have a . . .  check upon the power to oppress.'>n Duncan 's final evaluation of 
the Anti-Federalists is neither one extolment nor condemnation but as "Men of a 
Different Faith", "their loss ultimately has been our loss as well."73 
72 Ibid.: 394. 
73 Ibid.: 4 1 5 . 
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In part, the very generalization of Anti-Federalists is a faulty construction. As 
it is often acknowledged but rarely substantially dealt with in the historiographical 
matter, the Anti-Federalists represented a remarkable heterogeneity of opinion. 
Among the historians mentioned, Storing addresses this most directly, "It would be 
difficult to find a single point about which all of the Anti-Federalists agreed. They 
did not, finally, even agree unanimously in opposing the adoption of the 
Constitution."74 One need then in the historical literature is a systematic and specific 
account of several of the prominent and possibly even a few of the obscure Anti­
Federalists with an individual assessment of their particular and individual ideologies. 
Such a course of study may shed more light on what a general Anti-Federalist 
ideology might look like. Furthermore, while the number of theoretical frameworks 
and interpretations are sufficient to be adequate, topical studies of the Anti-Federalists 
measured against several of these frameworks is also apparently absent from the 
literature, such as "The Anti-Federalists on Militias and Standing Armies" or "The 
Anti-Federalists on Taxation" and maybe worthy pursuits of study. Perhaps more 
contentious but certainly appealing are how modem claims of associations with the 
Anti-Federalists might be appropriate from an ideological viewpoint; such as "The 
Libertarians and the Anti-Federalists". Obviously, as Duncan has been briefly 
presented, he would dismiss such an association but even his theory of Anti­
Federalism does not entirely exclude the possibility of a partial appropriate 
association. The Bill of Rights stands as the great legacy of the Anti-Federalists and 
while the literature reviewed for this study for the most part glossed over this 
74 Storing, What the Anti-Federalists were For, 5. 
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dimension of Anti-Federalist historical/political contribution, a glancing review of the 
literature in the political sciences would seem to indicate that this avenue of study is 
fertile for more historical review. Whiggish influence, particularly that of Cato's 
letters by the pen ofTrenchard and Gordon, also seem to be attractive possibilities for 
further investigation. 
Perhaps considering the rough treatment the Anti-Federalists have received, 
this author, in a moment of historical empathy would like to permit the Anti-
Federalists to have the last word of this historiography. Neither the Federalists nor 
the Anti-Federalists were above characterizing their opponents in derogatory ways, 
and neither side demonstrated any lack of sarcastic talent. This creed written by an 
Anti-Federalist, does much to sum up the Anti-Federalist perspective of what the 
Federalists stood for, albeit in a particularly tongue-in-cheek manner; speaking now 
for the Federalists: 
I believe in the infallibility, all-sufficient wisdom, and infinite goodness of the 
late convention; or in other words, I believe that some men are of so perfect a 
nature that it is absolutely impossible for them to commit errors or design 
villainy. I believe that the great body of the people are incapable of judging in 
their nearest concerns, and that, therefore, they ought to be guided by the 
opinions of their superiors . . . .I believe that aristocracy is the best form of 
government. . . .  I believe that trial by jury and the freedom of the press ought 
to be exploded from every wise government. . .  .I believe that the new 
constitution will prove the bulwark of liberty - the balm of misery - the 
essence of justice - and the astonishment of all mankind. In short, I believe 
that it is the best form of government which has ever been offered to the 
world. I believe that to speak, write, read, think, or hear any thing against the 
proposed government is damnable heresy, execrable rebellion, and high 
treason, against the sovereign majesty of the convention - And lastly I believe 
that every person who differs from me in belief is an infernal villain. AMEN.75 
75 Beard, Economic interpretation of the Constitution , 295. 
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Reconciling Contradictions: 
Unraveling Anti-Federalist Ideology Through a Conceptual Framework of Natural 
Rights 
"For the absurdity must continually stare us in the face of confiding to 
a government the direction of the most essential national interests, 
without daring to trust it to the authorities which are indispensable to 
their proper and efficient management. Let us not attempt to reconcile 
contradictions, but firmly embrace a rational alternative." Hamilton, 
The Federalist no. 23. ( 1788f6 
76 James Madison, The Federalist no. 23, 1 788. Accessed from: 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/ 1 8th century/fed23.asp on 20 1 0- 1 1 -22 on 201 0- 1 1 -22. 
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The Anti-Federalists pose a difficult subject for historical inquiry. Historians 
have generally grouped those authors who opposed the ratification of the Constitution 
together for conceptual simplicity but the Anti-Federalists would defy even this 
minimalist definition.77 The Anti-Federalists were remarkably varied in their 
concerns and critique, they attempted to appeal to different audiences, they often used 
pseudonyms, sometimes obscuring original authorship, and made use of various 
rhetorical modes (logos, ethos, and pathos) that are perhaps open to the criticisms of 
demagoguery, which compounds the difficulty of determining true concerns with 
mere attempts to persuade their audiences. 78 If these difficulties are compounded by 
the Anti-Federalists being guilty of Hamilton's charge of inconsistency, then an 
exacting lens is required to analyze the textual evidence as it stands. I will argue that 
adopting a conceptual framework that parses or interprets political speech based on an 
rationally established praxeology and a consistently applied Natural Law theoretical 
framework, will illuminate the Anti-Federalist inconsistency, indicating relative 
political ideologies that has not to my knowledge been previously elucidated within 
77 "It would be difficult to find a single point about which all of the Anti-Federalists agreed. They 
did not, finally, even agree unanimously in opposing the adoption of the Constitution." Storing, 5 .  
"Are they agreed, are any two of them agreed, in their objections to the remedy proposed, or in the 
proper one to be substituted?" - James Madison, The Federalist no. 38.  Accessed from 
http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa38.htm on 20 1 0- 1 1 - 1 6. [It is interesting that the Federalist 
response to the variation of criticism and sometime conflict within that criticism is that the conflict 
between critics rendered their arguments negligible, rather than seeing the need to defend the 
rationale for ratification from all criticism.] 
78 The use of pseudonyms were a part of the cultural print conventions of the time. Pseudonyms 
protected the authors from libel charges that were all too frequent (and only worsened after 
ratification of the Constitution with the Alien and Sedition Acts) and it allowed for community 
consideration of ideas without regard to the esteem of personalities. To explore the use of 
pseudonyms, in Federalist and Anti-Federalist thought see: Saul Cornell, The Other Founders: 
Anti-Federalism & the Dissenting Tradition in America, 1788-1828. (The University of North 
Carolina Press, Williamsburg VA. 1 999) 37-38, 76, 1 05- 1 06. 
40 
the historical context of the Anti-Federalists. 79 The Anti-Federalist legacy have had a 
significant impact on the current political landscape, as it was their objections to the 
Constitution that forced the ratifying conventions to amend the Constitution to 
include the Bill of Rights; if an examination of the Anti-Federalist contradiction may 
unravel their potentially latent political ideologies, I would consider the effort 
worthwhile. 
Historians have never been contented to be mere catalogers of facts but have 
instead, sought to apply explanatory functions to collections of evidence so as to 
make sense of the historical data; to weave a historical narrative with a loom of 
historical theory. It has been argued persuasively that it is not possible to construct a 
coherent history without such a theoretical background or historical perspective, 
which informs and directs the historical narrative. 80 Therefore, in the interest of 
clarity, the following is the outline for the conceptual framework used to interpret the 
complexity of the Anti-Federalist ideology. It is the absence of such a framework, 
which has lead to the conclusion that the Anti-Federalist ideology is more internally 
harmonious than will be shown. 
79 The particular formation of the natural law ideology argued for here is greatly in the debt of Ludwig 
von Mises' ,  Human Action (New Haven, Conn.:  Yale University Press, 1 949) and Murray N .  
Rothbard's, Man, Economy and State (Auburn, AL: Ludwig Von Mises Institute, 2009) and 
Rothbard's, Ethics of Liberty. (New York: University Press, 200 1 ). If history is a study largely of 
human agency, a praxeological application may be used to provide a conceptual framework for 
providing an interpretation of the historical narrative. "Action is purposive conduct. It is not simply 
behavior, but behavior begot by judgments of value, aiming at a definite end and guided by ideas 
concerning the suitabil ity or unsuitability of definite means . . . .  It  is conscious behavior. It is 
choosing. l t  is volition; it is a display of the will ." - Ludwig von Mises, Ultimate Foundation of 
Economic Science, (Princeton, N.J. :  D. Yon Nostrand, 1 964) 34. 
xo J .A. Passmore, "The Objectivity of History". Philosophy, Vol. 33, No. 1 25 (Apr., 1 95 8), pp. 97-
1 1 1 .  
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Royal Institute of Philosophy. " . . .  history's 
incurable subjectivity." Ibid. I l l .  
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All logical reasoning must proceed by irreducible axioms. Often these axioms 
are left unexamined; if the truth-value for them is found wanting, all conclusions 
derived thereof (while they may still be logically valid) are suspect. In order to avoid 
the criticism of circular reasoning, that reasoning in which the conclusions are used to 
validate the premises, I shall outline the axiomatic ethical principles under which the 
conceptual framework here used, is based. I do not here intend to construct a full 
philosophical defense of these principles but the conclusions thereby derived from 
them, pass for me and I hope for others, the intuitive ethical test; that is to say, that in 
nearly all ethical situations, the derivative ethical judgment based on these principles 
will be intuitively sound. 81 When these principles are extended to the 
traditional/historical social sphere will have radical political applications and will 
explain the crux of the Anti-Federalist inconsistency. Considered as first principles, 
these premises are offered as if they were obviously true unto themselves; I leave it to 
the reader to consider and criticize their truth-value upon their own subjective 
evaluation. 
The basis of the Natural Law argument requires the possibility of a rationally 
apprehended ethic; that there are universal and rationally apprehended laws inherent 
to the nature of people as ethical beings. For this conceptual framework, we shall 
consider this a principle premise, as a through defense of the principle of Natural Law 
would require a treatise all of its own but this should not be necessary, as the theory 
of natural law has had many able defenders. 82 For the purposes of conceptual clarity, 
K l  The subset of possible ethical scenarios consisting of "nearly all" is meant to exclude creative 
logical paradoxes and various "lifeboat" scenarios. 
K2 Martin Luther King, "Letter from Birmingham City Jail ": "one has a moral responsibility to 
disobey unjust laws . . . . . .  an individual who breaks a law that conscience tells him is unjust and 
who willingly accepts the penalty of imprisonment in order to arouse the conscience of the 
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the concept ofNatural Law differs from positive law in as much as the principles of 
Natural Law which inform ethical content are theoretically universal and apprehended 
by the rational mind, whereas Positive Law is particular and circumstantial. The 
concept of Natural Law suffers epistemically from the lack of agreement among 
rational minds to apprehend all of its aspects and in all of its applications, whereas, 
Positive Law can be much more easily apprehended or at least predicted but suffers 
from the potential for injustice or of arbitrariness. It is not difficult to concede that 
laws that are simply posited may be unjust or arbitrary ( slavery or the Holocaust) and 
to the extent that they are, they fail the challenge of St. Augustine's tenet, "An unjust 
law is no law at all."83 If Augustine's proposition is fundamentally sound, then the 
theory of positive law must be rendered superfluous. 
Natural law is a necessary precursor to Natural Rights; for without the 
conceptual establishment ofNatural Law, from whence might a basis for natural 
rights precede? For the purposes of this theoretical framework, we take as our next 
community over its injustice, is in reality expressing the highest respect for law." 
(http://abacus.bates.edu/admin/offices/dos/mlk/letter.html). William Blackstone as quoted in the 
"Declaration of Sentiments " by Elizabeth Cady Stanton: "This law of nature, being co-eval with 
mankind and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding 
over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to 
this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or 
immediately, from this original" ( 1 979, 4 1 ). Henry David Thoreau "Civil Disobedience": "Under a 
government which imprisons any unjustly, the true place for a just man is also a prison." St. 
Thomas Aquinas, Treatise on Law. (Regnery Publishing, Inc. Washington D.C. 1 996), 33: "A 
tyrannical law, through not being according to reason, is not a law, absolutely speaking, but rather a 
perversion of law;". Sophicles, Antigone: [Antigone responding to Creon's charge at having 
violated Creon's law forbidding the burial of her brother] " . . .  for it was not Zeus that had published 
me that edict; not such are the Jaws set among men by the justice who dwells with the gods below; 
nor deemed I that thy decrees were of such force, that a mortal could override the unwritten and 
unfailing statutes of heaven. For their life is not of to-day or yesterday, but from all time, and no 
man knows when they were first put forth." 
83 Augustine, On Free Choice Of The Will, Book 1 :  5 .  trans. Thomas Williams (Cambridge: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1 993), 8. [That is to say, if any law that is posited by a particular person or 
group of persons, fails to correspond to the nature of rationally apprehended justice, such a law has 
no ethical force or justification and must be considered as illegitimate.] 
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premise the principle of a natural right to self-ownership and the derivative principle 
of private property. This principle is most famously explained by John Locke: 
[E]very man has a property in his own person. This nobody has any right to 
but himself. The labour of his body and the work of his hands, we may say, 
are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath 
provided, an left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it 
something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him 
removed from the common state nature placed it in, it hath by this labour 
something annexed to it that excludes the common right of other men. 84 
The principle of self-ownership carries with it, the rational extension of that 
ownership, to one's labors and the products thereof, in as much as any theory of 
personal property is possible. 85 If a person has a natural right to self-ownership and to 
legitimately obtained property, then what is entailed by this right? It must mean at 
least this : that in all cases, it is illegitimate and immoral, for any individual, or group 
of individuals acting in concert, to initiate aggressive action against another (or make 
a reasonable threat thereof) with the intention of deprivation of another person's life, 
liberty or property (or any and all natural rights). This minimalist definition of what 
entails a natural right has been variously designated as the principle of non-
aggression. Murray Rothbard elucidates the condition this way: 
. . .  it is a man's right to do whatever he wishes with his own person; it is his 
right not to be molested or interfered with by violence from exercising that 
right. But what may be the moral or immoral way of exercising that right is a 
question of personal ethics rather than of political philosophy - which is 
84 John Locke, An Essay Conerning the True Origin, Extent, and End of Civil Government, V. pp. 27-
28, in Two Treatises of Government, P. Laslett, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1 960). 
85 "The right to enjoy liberty is inalienable. . . . Every man has a right to his own body - to the 
products of his own labor - to the protection of law. . .. That all these laws which are now in force, 
admitting the right of slavery, are, therefore, before God, utterly null and void . . .  and therefore they 
ought instantly to be abrogated." -William Lloyd Garrison, "Declaration of Sentiments of the 
American Anti-Slavery Convention" (December 1 833), cited in W. and J. Pease, eds., The 
Antislavery Argument (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1 965) 
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concerned solely with matters of right, and ofthe proper or improper exercise 
of physical violence in human relations. 86 
Therefore, the basis of our conceptual framework is a Natural Law theory that 
provides the basis for the natural right of self-ownership and that this right forms the 
basis of a theory of ethics of how individuals may act in accordance with this latter 
principle ofnon-aggression. Given this framework, political action is conceptually 
reduced to an ethical analysis regarding the proper or improper exercise of physical 
violence (or coercion) in human relations. 87 The principle of non-aggression might 
have been posited from the beginning but then the framework for interpretation 
offered here might be accused of applying modem values that were not capable of 
being rationally expressed due to the historical progression of ideas at the time. I will 
show that the Anti-Federalists, shared implicitly a very similar conceptual framework 
of Natural Law but this framework can be found in America even prior to the 
American revolution. In the words of Elisha Williams, Congregational minister, 
legislator, jurist, and rector ofYale College from 1726 to 1 739, writing his, "A 
Seasonable Plea for the Liberty of Conscience and the Right of Private Judgment in 
Matters of Religion Without any Controul from Human Authority" in 1 728:88 
As reason tells us, all are born thus naturally equal, i.e. with an equal right to 
their persons, so also with an equal right to their preservation . . .  and every 
man having a property in his own person, the labour of his body and the work 
of his hands are properly his own, to which no one has right but himself; it 
will therefore follow that when he removes anything out of the state that 
nature has provided and left it in, he has mixed his labour with it, and joined 
something to it that is his own, and thereby makes it his property . . . .  Thus 
every man having a natural right to (or being proprietor of) his own person 
86 Murray N. Rothbard. The Ethics ofLibery. (New York: New York University Press, 200 1 )  24. 
87 Correspondingly, this analysis would reduce the sphere of economics into those 
voluntary/consensual exchanges. 
88 Elisha Williams' credentials obtained by www.wikipedia.org Accessed from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elisha Williams on 20 I 0-1 1 -04. 
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and his own actions and labour, which we call property, it certainly follows, 
that no man can have a right to the person or property of another: And if every 
man has a right to his person and property; he has also a right to defend 
them . . .  and so has a right of punishing all insults upon his person and 
property. n89 
This framework for the interpretation of human action, considers the 
purposeful actions of the individual as the primary unit for ethical, political and 
economic analysis.90 When individuals act in concert, their actions necessarily 
emanating from each individual's volition, their actions must be analyzed as separate 
individual ethical evaluations. This analysis declines to admit groups of individuals 
as corporate ethical entities; therefore political action, as corporate-group action, 
cannot be admitted as legitimate if such action violates Natural Law or the natural 
rights of individuals. In fact, the concept ofNatural Rights does not admit the ability 
of the individual to divest herself of her natural rights even if she were inclined to do 
so, such as by selling oneself into permanent bondage; such an action would be the 
logical equivalent of a denial her own personhood, which is why natural rights are 
properly said to be inalienable. 91 
89 Ellis Sandoz, Political Sermons of the American Founding Era: 1 730- 1 805, (2nd ed. Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund, 1 998). vol. 1 .  chap. 3: Elisha Williams, "The Essential Rights and Liberties of 
Protestants". 
Accessed from http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/8 1 6/69224 on 201 0- 1 1 -04 
90 "All rational action is in the first place individual action. Only the individual thinks. Only the 
individual reasons. Only the individual acts." -Ludwig von Mises. Socialism. (New Haven, Conn: 
Yale University Press 1 95 1  ) .  97. 
91 "When a man renounces his liberty he renounces his essential manhood, his rights, and even his 
duty as a human being. There is no compensation possible for such complete renunciation. It is 
incompatible with man's nature, and to deprive him of his free will is to deprive his action of all 
moral sanction. The convention, in short, which sets up on one side an absolute authority, and on 
the other an obligation to obey with question, is  vain and meaningless. Is it not obvious that where 
we can demand everything we own nothing? Where there is no mutual obligation, no interchange 
of duties, it must, surely, be clear that the actions of the commended cease to have any moral value? 
For how can it be maintained that my slave has any 'right' against me when everything that he has 
is my property? His right being my right, it is absurd to speak of it as ever operating to my 
disadvantage." - Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, bk. I ,  chap. 4, in E Barker, ed., 
Social Contract (New York: Oxford University Press, 1 948), p. 1 75. 
46 
The inalienability of natural rights is the rebuttal of Social Contract theory, 
which as will be shown later, is the philosophical slippery slope which often at the 
center of the Anti-Federalist contradiction. The theory of Social Contract requires 
that individuals relinquish a certain portion of their natural rights in order to form a 
social compact in which their other natural rights may be better preserved, however, 
this justification fails to retain the explicit consent required of contracts and permits 
the abuse of the weaker party. The unfortunate consequence of the theory of Social 
Contract is the latent possibility of attempted legitimization of any actions of a ruling 
body (who creates, enforces and interprets the terms of the contract) under the 
pretense of a tacit consent of the governed. The Social Contract theory creates a 
hegemonic relationship, one in which the weaker or governed party is automatically 
considered as having consented to the contract (implied or tacit consent) and has no 
power or to extricate herself from the supposed contract; that merely existing within a 
certain place/time one has implied the surrender of certain natural rights for one's 
own alleged benefit.92 As the legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin notes: 
So some political philosophers have been tempted to say that we have in fact 
agreed to the social contract of that kind tacitly, by not just emigrating when 
we reach the age of consent. But no one can argue that very long with a 
straight face. Consent cannot be binding on people, in the way this argument 
requires, unless it is given more freely, and with more genuine alternate 
choice, than just by declining to build a life from nothing under a foreign flag. 
And even if the consent were genuine, the argument would fail as an argument 
for legitimacy, because a person leaves one sovereign only to join another; he 
has no choice to be free from sovereigns altogether.93 
92 "All men are born free; liberty is a gift which they receive from God himself; nor can they alienate 
the same by consent, though possibly they may forfeit it by crimes. No man . . .  can . . .  give away 
the lives and liberties, religion or acquired property of his posterity, who will be born as free as he 
himself was born, and can never be bound by his wicked and ridiculous bargain." -John Trechard 
and Thomas Gordon, Cato s Letters, no. 59, in D.L. Jackson, ed., The English Libertarian Heritage 
{Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1 965), p. l 08. 
47 
This is the basic outline for a conceptual framework based on a theory of 
Natural Law which may be used to analyze Anti-Federalist texts in order to 
understand their internal ideological contradictions and thereby to gain greater insight 
into the Anti-Federalist ideological landscape. I will endeavor to show that the Anti-
Federalists accepted the basis for such a Natural Law theory and yet their failure to 
apply this theory consistently would prove their culpability of the Hamiltonian charge 
of contradiction. 
The historian Saul Cornell ( 1999) correctly identifies the weakness in the 
Anti-Federalist historiography, " . . .  historians have invariably sought an authoritative 
Anti-Federalist position, focusing on a single strain of Anti-Federalism as an 
expression ofthe true voice of the opposition to the Constitution."94 In constructing a 
coherent Anti-Federalist historical narrative, the prejudice has been to reconcile the 
apparent inconsistencies of the Anti-Federalist internal ideology; the propensity of 
historians to create coherent narratives produces a prejudice to reconcile 
inconsistencies and ignore ideological contradictions in favor of thematic unity or 
essential identity. Yet most historians have recognized the central inconsistency; the 
historian Herbert Storing would grapple with the Anti-Federalist contradiction this 
way: 
93 Ronald Dworkin, Law 's Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
1 986) 1 92-3. 
94 Saul Cornell, The Other Founders: Anti-Federalism & the Dissenting Tradition in America, 1788-
1828. (Williamsburg VA: The University of North Carolina Press, 1 999) 7. Cornell seems to be 
referring directly to Herbert Storing and Cecelia Kenyon, "We are looking not for what is common 
so much as for what is fundamental . . . .  the theoretical ground that most other Anti-Federalists took 
for granted." -Herbert J. Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were FOR: The Political Thought of 
the Opponents of the Constitution. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1 9 8 1 ). " . . .  they 
shared a large body of political ideas and attitudes, together with a common heritage of political 
institutions." -Cecilia Kenyon, "Men of Little Faith: The Anti-Federalists on the Nature of 
Representative Government" The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, 1 2, no. 1 (Jan 1 955): 
37-3 8. 
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This is the critical weakness of Anti-Federalist thought and at the same time 
its strength and even its glory. For the Anti-Federalists could neither fully 
reject nor fully accept the leading principles of the Constitution. They were 
indeed open to Hamilton's scornful charge of trying to reconcile 
contradictions . . . .  They did not fail to see the opportunity for American 
nationhood . . .  but they could not join in grasping it. They doubted; they held 
back; they urged second thoughts. This was, however, not a mere failure of 
will or lack of courage. They had reasons, and the reasons have weight. They 
thought - and it cannot easily be denied - that this great national opportunity 
was profoundly problematical, that it could be neither grasped nor let alone 
without risking everything. The Anti-Federalists were committed to both 
union and the states; to both the great American republic and the small, self­
governing community; to both commerce and civic virtue; to both private gain 
and public good.95 
Yet even with this recognition of the Anti-Federalist contradiction, Storing would still 
strive for a unified ideology, " . . .  the Anti-Federalists themselves understood their . . .  
conclusions . . .  to be derived from a positive political theory or set of political 
principles".96 While Storing would try to glean what he thought fundamental to Anti-
Federalist thought, Cornell would adopt a different tact by subdividing Anti-
Federalists themselves into several interests groups in order to smooth the ideological 
disparity, yet Cornell still seems to comprehend the internal contradiction within Anti-
Federalist thought, the "Anti-Federalists sought to reconcile the contradictions 
between their concern for liberty and their commitment to the rights of the people to 
legislate on behalf of the good of the community". 97 
The Anti-Federalists generally agreed with the Federalists about the 
inadequacy of the Articles of Confederation.98 In the letters of the Federal Farmer, "It 
95 Herbert J Storing. What the Anti-Federalists Were FOR: The Political Thought of the Opponents 
of the Constitution. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1 98 1 )  6. 
96 Ibid. 5 .  
97 Saul Cornell, The Other Founders: Anti-Federalism & the Dissenting Tradition in America, 1788-
1828. (The University of North Carolina Press, Williamsburg Y.A. 1 999) 6. 
98 The Anti-Federalists were not completely united in this agreement however, particularly in the 
early debate, many still expressed their esteem for the Articles of the Confederation, "Sir, I venerate 
the spirit with which every thing was done at the trying time in which the Confederation was 
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must, however, be admitted, that our federal system is defective," but the issue for the 
Anti-Federalists was whether the proposed Constitution was a legal proposal and 
consistent with what the Anti-Federalists supposed to be the values of the American 
Revolution and their heritage of respect for civil liberties .99 The impetus for the 
proposal of the Philadelphia Convention was admission of the Congress that the 
Articles of Confederation were in some ways deficient but the Anti-Federalists 
contended that the Convention had exceeded its bounds. The Philadelphia 
Convention had been convened, "for the sole and express purpose of revising the 
Articles of Confederation" and did not have the legal authority to propose an entirely 
different constitution of government. 100 Patrick Henry remarked during the Virginia 
ratifying convention, "That they exceeded their power is perfectly clear . . .  The 
Federal Convention ought to have amended the old system - for that purpose they 
were solely delegated: The object of their mission extended to no other 
consideration." 101 This excess of the Convention was multiplied by the fact that the 
proposed Constitution carried with it a new legal standard for its own ratification; to 
alter the Articles of Confederation, the requirement was to "be agreed to in a congress 
of the united States, and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State." 
formed. America had then a sufficiency of this virtue to resolve to resist perhaps the first nation in 
the universe, even unto bloodshed. What was her aim? Equal liberty and safety. What ideas had 
she of this equal liberty? Read them in her Articles of Confederation." -G. Livingston [Herbert J 
Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were FOR. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1 98 1 )  
8.] 
99 Herbert Storing, The Anti-Federalist. (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1 985) Federal Farmer 
2 .8.2. 
100 Herbert Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For (University of Chicago Press, Chicago: 
1 98 1 )  7. [Regarding the proposed Constitution Patrick Henry states, "A proposal that goes to the 
utter annihilation of those solemn engagements of the States." {Herbert Storing, The Anti­
Federalist (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1 985) 5 . 1 6. 1 . } ]  
101 Herbert Storing, The Anti-Federalist. (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1 985) 5 . 1 6. 1 .  
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while the Constitution deemed itself ratified with the approval of only three fourths of 
the state legislatures. 102 Luther Martin would warn: 
. . .  the same reasons which you now urge for destroying our present federal 
government, may be urged for abolishing the system which you now propose 
to adopt; and as the method prescribed by the articles of confederation is now 
totally disregarded by you, as little regard may be shown by you to the rules 
prescribed for the amendment of the new system . 103 
As the movement for the ratification of the proposed Constitution gained 
velocity, it became clear to most Anti-Federalists that they could not rely solely of the 
issue ofthe illegality of its ratification method but they would have to demonstrate 
sustained critique of the Constitution itself, in order to block its ratification. 
The primary political objection of the Anti-Federalists was how the 
Constitution seemed to detract from the sovereignty of the states. In a twist of 
historical irony, it was the Anti-Federalists who favored and advocated for a true 
federal government of sovereign states, while it would be the Federalists who instead 
supported the proposed Constitution because it promoted a mixture of national and 
federal government. This divergence induced the Anti-Federalists to show that the 
proposed Constitution had in its formulation, improper and indefinite objectives of 
government, and excessive means of government; and that these two indiscretions 
combined to threaten state sovereignty and individual rights. 
The ends or purpose of the general government proposed by the Constitution 
may be found in its preamble, "We the People of the United States, in Order to form a 
more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the 
102 Articles ofConfederation. Accessed from http://www.usconstitution.net/articles.html#Article l 3  on 
20 1 0-1 1 -22 
103 Herbert Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For (University of Chicago Press, Chicago: 
1 9 8 1 )  7-8. 
5 1  
common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to 
ourselves and our Posterity". The Anti-Federalists found much to object to on the 
basis of the preamble alone. Patrick Henry would object to the use of the phrase, "We 
the People" as an unjustified, over-extension of the express purpose given to the 
Philadelphia Convention by Congress : 
What right had they to say, We, the People . . .  who authorized them to speak 
the language of , We, the People, instead of We, the States? . . . If the States be 
not the agents of this compact, it must be one great consolidated National 
Government of the people of all the States . . .  The people gave them no power 
to use their name. That they exceeded their power is perfectly clear. 104 
While Brutus protested explicitly on the openness of interpretation permitted in the 
I 
language of the preamble, a theme to which the Anti-Federalists would continually 
return: 
The great objects then are declared in this preamble in general and indefinite 
terms to be to provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, 
and an express power being vested in the legislature to make all laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution all the powers vested 
in the general government. The inference is natural that the legislature will 
have an authority to make all laws which they shall judge necessary for the 
common safety, and to promote the general welfare. This amounts to a power 
to make laws at discretion: No terms can be found more indefinite than these, 
and it is obvious, that the legislature alone must judge what laws are proper 
and necessary for the purpose. 105 
For both the Federalists and Anti-Federalists, the purposes or ends of 
government could only be justified in the sense of general welfare or public 
good/happiness, this after all is the ideological justification for entering into the 
alleged social contract, that a person 's liberty and property may be better secured by 
entering into the social arrangement than not. However, for the Anti-Federalists, the 
104 Herbert Storing, The Anti-Federalist. (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1 985) 5 . 1 6. 1  
105 ibid. 2.9.57 
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purpose of government is the preservation and protect of rights and liberties, rather 
that the provision of an optimized degree of public good/happiness, as may have been 
conceived by the Federalists. Mercy Otis Warren under the pseudonym of A 
Columbian Patriot writing in various passages of her letters, "The principle aim of 
society is to protect individuals in the absolute rights which were vested in them by 
the immediate laws of nature" and, "the rights of individuals ought to be the primary 
object of all government" and "government is instituted for the protection, safety, and 
happiness of the people." 106 It was not that the Anti-Federalists objected to the idea 
that the general welfare was a legitimate end of government, for, "the object of every 
free government is the public good . . .  " but that the general welfare would be best 
pursued by minimizing the number of rights necessary to be surrendered or alienated, 
in order to promote the general welfare, rather then the direct pursuit of an 
optimization of the general welfare itself: 107 
The design of civil government is to protect the rights and promote the 
happiness of the people. For this end, rulers are invested with powers. But 
we cannot from hence justly infer that these powers should be unlimited. 
There are certain rights which mankind possess, over which government 
ought not to have any controul, because it is not necessary they should, in 
order to attain the end of its institution. There are certain things which rulers 
should be absolutely prohibited from doing, because, if they should do them, 
they would work an injury, not a benefit to the people. 108 
106 Saul Cornell, The Other Founders. (The University of North Carolina Press, Williamsburg V.A. 
1 999) 56. 
107 Herbert Storing, The Anti-Federalist. (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1 985) 2.9.45 . "the 
great end of civil government is to protect the weak from the oppression of the powerful to put 
every man upon the level of equal liberty . . . .  " -Centinel. [Herbert Storing, The Anti-Federalist. 
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1 985) 2.7 . 1 07.] 
108 Ibid. Bmtus 2.9. 1 02 
53 
The pursuit of the general welfare as an end unto itself was a negation of the purposes 
of government, it gave too much power to the government which consequently 
threatened too much civil and personal liberty. 
The Anti-Federalist objections towards the proposed ends of government were 
in the balance minor in comparison to the emphatic objections against the provision 
of the means for government. As stated succinctly by none other than George 
Washington, "Government is not reason, it is not eloquence - it is force !  Like fire it 
is a dangerous servant and a fearful master; never for a moment should it be left to 
irresponsible action."109 Though Washington is not generally considered as among 
the Anti-Federalists, he expresses here the basic Anti-Federalist objection towards the 
means of government. Hamilton and Madison in the Federalist, argued that it was 
appropriate and necessary for the general government, that it should have all the 
means necessary in order to accomplish its ends and consequently justifying the 
Necessary and Proper clause: 
This is one of those truths which, to a correct and unprejudiced mind, carries 
its own evidence along with it; and may be obscured, but cannot be made 
plainer by argument or reasoning. It rests upon axioms as simple as they are 
universal; the MEANS ought to be proportioned to the END; the persons, 
from whose agency the attainment of any END is expected, ought to possess 
the MEANS by which it is to be attained. 1 10 
109 Upton Sinclair, A Cry for Justice (John C. Winston Company, Philadelphia 1 9 1 5) 305. (This is the 
earliest source readily available for this quotation, in this respect the attribution may be suspect.) 
110 James Madison, The Federalist no. 23.  Accessed from: 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/1 8th century/fed23 .asp on 20 1 0- 1 1 -22. "Few parts of the Constitution 
(the Necessary and Proper clause] have been assailed with more intemperance than this; yet on a 
fair investigation of it, no part can appear more completely invulnerable. Without the 
SUBSTANCE of this power, the whole Constitution would be a dead letter." - James Madison, The 
Federalist no. 44. Accessed at http://avalon. law.yale.edu/1 8th century/fed44.asp on 20 1 0- 1 1 -22. 
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This was a central point of controversy for the Anti-Federalists who tended to 
abhor the idea of the use force or coercion to meet the purposes of government. 1 1 1  
Instead, the Anti-Federalists tended to think of  the proper role of  government as a 
leader or promoter of public virtue by use of persuasion. The Federal Farmer 
expresses the sentiment this way, "I conceive, for a government to be so free, or so 
supported by voluntary consent, as never to want force to compel obedience to the 
laws."1 12 For the Anti-Federalists, the use of force or coercion negates or contradicts 
the very ends government is supposed to pursue: 1 1 3 
Every government must be supported, either by the people having such an 
attachment to it, as to be ready, when called upon, to support it, or by a force 
at the command of the government, to compel obedience. The latter mode 
destroys every idea of a free government; . . .  for the same force . . .  probably 
would be used to·wrest from the people their constitutional liberties. 1 14 
While James Madison would be considered the nemesis of the Anti-Federalists during 
his tenure as co-author of the Federalist Papers, after the ratification of the 
Constitution, the Hamiltonian Madison would undergo a transformation into the 
Jeffersonian Madison and by 1 829 would speak in a voice in keeping with the 
sentiments of the Anti-Federalists on the dangers of giving governments the means to 
accomplish their specified ends: 
It is sufficiently obvious, that persons now and property are the two great 
subjects on which Governments are to act; and that the rights of persons, and 
the rights of property, are the objects, for the protection of which Government 
1 1 1  "I  take i t  for granted, as  an axiom in  politic, that the people should never authorise their rulers to 
do any thing, which if done, would operate to their injury." - Brutus. [Herbert Storing, The Anti­
Federalist. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1 9 85) 2.9.98] 
1 1 2  Herbert Storing, The Anti-Federalist. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1 985) The Federal 
Farmer 2.8.93 
1 13  "Neither the general government, nor the state governments, ought to be vested with all the powers 
proper to be exercised for promoting the end of government." -Brutus. [Herbert Storing, The Anti­
Federalist. (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1 985) 2.9.80] 
1 14 Ibid. Brutus 2.9.48. 
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was instituted. These rights cannot well be separated. The personal right to 
acquire property, which is a natural right, gives to property, when acquired, a 
right to protection, as a social right. The essence of Government is power; 
and power, lodged as it must be in human hands, will ever be liable to abuse. 
In monarchies, the interests and happiness of all may be sacrificed to the 
caprice and passions of a despot. In aristocracies, the rights and welfare of the 
many may be sacrificed to the pride and cupidity of the few. In republics, the 
great danger is, that the majority may not sufficiently respect the rights of the 
minority. 1 15 
For the Anti-Federalists, it was necessary for the government to have the 
consent of the people, for the government would not require the use of force to 
compel and enforce obedience to laws if those laws were seen as just by all people. 
This was the model of the ideal government as expressed by Federal Farmer, "I 
conceive, for a government to be so free, or so supported by voluntary consent, as 
never to want force to compel obedience to the laws" and this is concurred by Brutus, 
"The origin of society then is to be sought . . .  in the united consent of those who 
associate."1 16 This then is Anti-Federalist rebuke to the Necessary and Proper clause; 
if the laws passed by the general government are just, then no use of force by the 
government is necessary to obtain obedience, therefore there can be no use of force to 
compel obedience that can be said to be appropriate. 1 1 7  
1 1 5 James Madison, Speech in the Virginia Constitutional Convention, December 2 ,  1 829. Accessed 
from http·//www.constitution.org/jm/1 829 1 202 vaconcon.txt on 201 0- 1 1 -22. 
1 16 Herbert Storing, The Anti-Federalist. (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1 985) 2.8.93, 2.9.24. 
1 1 7 "After the general idea of virtue, I know of no higher principle than that of rights; these two ideas, 
rather, are united in one. The idea of rights is simply that of virtue introduced into the political 
world. It was the idea of rights that enabled men to define anarchy and tyranny, that taught them 
how to be independent without arrogance and to obey without servility. The man who submits to 
violence is debased by his compliance; but when he submits to a right of authority that he 
acknowledges in a fellow creature, he rises in some measure above the person who gives the 
command. There are no great men without virtue; and there are no great nations - it may almost be 
added, there would be no society - without respect for rights, for what is a union of rational and 
intelligent beings who are held together only by the bond of force?"-Tocqueville [Marvin 
Zetterbaum. Tocgueville and the Problem of Democracy. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1 967) 40.] 
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Brutus, one of the most cogent of the Anti-Federalists, would invoke the 
Declaration oflndependence as a defense of the Anti-Federalist perspective: 
. . .  they hold this truth as self-evident, that all men are by nature free. No one 
man, therefore, or any class of men, have a right by the law of nature, or of 
God, to assume or exercise authority over their fellows. The origin of society 
then is to be sought, not in any natural right which one man has to exercise 
authority over another, but in the united consent of those who associate. 1 18 
For Brutus, individuals enter into social compacts for the purpose of their own mutual 
protection and defense. This mutual benefit for the protection of their natural rights, 
he calls their "common good" and that "the common good, therefore, is the end of 
civil government, and common consent, the foundation on which it is established. To 
effect this end, it was necessary that a certain portion of natural liberty should be 
surrendered, in order, that what remained should be preserved" but to which natural 
liberties Brutus is willing to admit are surrendered, he responds, "I shall not now 
enquire."1 19 However, Brutus indicates that only so much of that portion of an 
individual's natural liberty should be surrendered as is necessary to, "establish laws 
for the promoting the happiness of the community, and to carry those laws into 
effect."120 There is however a caveat to this condition of Brutus, "it is not necessary, 
for this purpose, that individuals should relinquish all of their natural rights. Some 
are of such a nature that they cannot be surrendered" such as, "the rights of 
conscience, the right of enjoying and defending life" and some other natural liberties, 
"are not necessary to be resigned, in order to attain the end for which government is 
instituted . . .  to surrender them, would counteract the very end of government, to wit, 
118 Herbert Storing, The Anti-Federalist. (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1 985). 2.9.24. 
1 1 9  ibid. 2.9.24. 
120 ibid. 2.9.24. 
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the common good." 121 It should be carefully noted that Brutus, though seemingly 
compelled to acknowledge that some certain portion of a person's natural rights must 
be given up, is not willing to enumerate them, while in the same passage he is quick 
to endorse which are to be preserved as inalienable. The fundamental problem that 
Brutus' argument evades is that if the natural rights of individuals are to be 
surrendered for their mutual protection and the powers to accomplish this protection 
is submitted or supplied to the authority of government, how is the individual to 
protect themselves from the arbitrary authority of government? 1 22 The problem is 
stated far more eloquently by none other than the personage of the pseudonymous 
Federalist author, Publius: 
"If men were angels, no government would b� necessary. If angels were to 
govern men, neither external nor internal controuls on government would be 
necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over 
men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to 
controul the governed; and in the next place, oblige it to controul itself." 123 
While Brutus would attempt to contend with the erroneous integration of the 
Social Contract theory with a theory of Natural Rights, Federal Farmer would attempt 
his own exposition of the characteristics ofNatural Rights in regards to entering the 
civil polity. Federal Farmer would make a rather uniquely egalitarian statement 
concerning the conception of Natural Rights, so much so that he would ascribe it not 
just to Americans or Englishmen but to all peoples: 
1 2 1  Ibid. 2.9.24. 
122 
" 
• • •  men came together, and agreed that certain rules should be formed, to regulate the conduct of 
all, and the power of the whole community lodged in the hands of the rulers to enforce obedience to 
them. But the rulers have the same propensities as other men; they are as likely to use the power . . .  
to the injury and oppression of those over whom they are placed . . . .  It is therefore a proper that 
bounds should be set to their authority, as that government should have at first been instituted to 
restrain private injuries." - Brutus. Herbert Storing, The Anti-Federalist. (University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago 1 985) 2.9.24. 
123 Herbert Storing, The Anti-Federalist. (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1 985) 1 9 1 - 1 92. 
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Men, in some countries do not remain free, merely because they are entitled to 
natural and unalienable rights; men in all countries are entitle to them, not 
because their ancestors once got together and enumerated them on paper, but 
because, by repeated negociations and declarations, all parties are brought to 
realize them, and of course to believe them to be sacred. 124 
It is necessary therefore in Federal Farmer's ideation, to declare the natural and 
inalienable rights, "not depending on silent titles," that there might be a communal 
recognition of these rights so they may in time become sacred to all and therefore no 
person would be willing to violate them and the community would then instantly 
recognize any transgression upon those rights. 125 Federal Farmer observes the custom 
of England: 
"When the people of England got together, at the time they formed the Magna 
Charta . . .  they were indisputably entitled to certain natural and unalienable 
rights . . .  they by declaratory act, expressly recognized them, . . .  and therefore, 
that the people might not forget these rights, and gradually become prepared 
for arbitrary government, . . .  to be read twice a year in public places, . . .  to fix 
the contents of it in the minds of the people." 126 
This requirement and emphasis on the explicit declaration of what natural rights are 
maintained by individuals is likely a refutation of the original Federalist position that 
the inclusion of a bill of rights was not required by the Constitution. The Federalist, 
James Wilson's well known speech in which Wilson claimed it would not be 
necessary to enumerate the rights reserved to the people because to make such an 
enumeration of rights would imply that, "every thing which is not reserved is [then] 
given" but if a bill of rights is to be omitted, then the reverse is implied and, "every 
thing which is not given, is reserved." 127 
114 ibid. The Federal Farmer 2.8. 1 96. 
115  ibid. 2.8. 1 96. 
116 ibid. The Federal Fanner 2.8. 1 96. 
117 Bernard Bailyn ed., The Debate on the Constitution. (New York: Literary Classics of the United 
States, Inc., 1 993) 64. 
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Like Brutus, Federal Farmer seems to indicate that some rights must be given 
up in the, "forming of the social compact" but, like Brutus, it is difficult to discern 
explicitly what these might be from his writings as he fails to describe the kinds of 
rights that are surrendered in the act of forming the social compact. Federal Farmer 
attempts to make some distinction between different kinds of rights, "of rights, some 
are natural and unalienable, of which even the people cannot deprive individuals: 
Some are constitutional or fundamental; these cannot be altered or abolished by the 
ordinary laws . . .  " but this distinction is not always maintained and Federal Farmer can 
also be detected taking a more immoderate stance: 128 
There are certain unalienable and fundamental rights, which in forming the 
social compact, ought to be explicitly ascertained and fixed - a free and 
enlightened people, in forming this compact, will not resign all their rights to 
those who govern, and they will fix limits to their legislators and rulers, . . .  [so 
that the limits of the rulers] cannot be passed . . .  without giving a general 
alarm. 129 
Even in making a concession to the Federalist position, the Federalist Farmer deems it 
necessary to repeat this principle; "It is proper the national laws should be supreme, 
and superior to state or district laws: but then the national laws ought to yield to 
unalienable or fundamental rights . . . .  " 130 
In their opposition to the ratification of the Constitution, Anti-Federalists 
became mired in an enmeshment of their own ideological heritage as they were pulled 
by two different, irreconcilable ideologies. The first ideology being the newly 
incorporated theory ofNatural Law/Natural Rights, while the second ideology being 
the historically inherited ideology of rulership/political-sovereignty (or put another 
128 Herbert Storing, The Anti-Federalist. (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1 985) 2.8.80. 
129 ibid. 2.8. 1 9. 
130 ibid. 2.8 .49. 
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way, the ideology of self-ownership with non-reciprocal ownership of others). The 
ideology of natural rights, proposes that individual persons are inalienable self­
owners, that person 'Z' owns herself (individual sovereignty); while the second 
ideology, the ideology of self-ownership with non-reciprocal ownership of others, 
person 'X' is a self-owner (individually sovereign), who may/must also own 'Y' but 
that 'Y' does-not and can-not own 'X ' .  In this latter case, 'Y' does not have self­
ownership but may properly said to be the property of 'X';  'Y' then belongs to some 
set of, "subhuman beings who do not have a right to participate as full human-beings 
in the rights of self-ownership enjoyed" by 'X ' .  131 
The ethical ideology ofrulership/political-sovereignty became part of the 
historical inheritance ofthe Anti-Federalists by way of the chieftains, kings, tyrants or 
despots; who used the means of force, violence and coercion to animate their will 
upon others. It is not difficult to see how it would be useful for such persons to have 
at their disposal, a rational, or at least seemingly rational justification for �eir 
aggressive acts against others; the feudal exchange of protection for the right of 
taxation, the divine right of kings, and theory of social contract would only be a few 
examples of these justifications. These justifications would become transformed by 
the episodes of monarchical overthrow and a theory of popular sovereignty would 
generally supplant the theory monarchical sovereignty in popular belief. 
The concept of popular sovereignty would, at first glance solve the ethical 
problem of an ideology of rulership/political-sovereignty, as the people would seem 
to own themselves under popular sovereignty. However, a more rigorous analysis 
131  Murray Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty. (New York University Press: New York, 2002) 45-46. 
6 1  
reveals that popular sovereignty as a substitution for a monarchical or aristocratic 
sovereignty does not change the basic ethical ideology of self-ownership with non-
reciprocal ownership of others; in popular sovereignty, person 'Y' does not truly have 
ownership of herself but rather, the total set of persons in the given polity ( 'A' , 'B ' ,  
'C' ,  through 'Y') has some claim of ownership upon 'Y' while 'Y' has only a partial 
and rather inconsequential claim of ownership of the total set. This basic critique 
does not change if it is altered to the majority ofthe total set (democracy) or if it is 
the majority of a chosen subset (representatives of a republic). The only stipulation of 
popular sovereignty in its base ethical form that is different from the original ideology 
ofrulership/political-sovereignty is the negation of the initial self-ownership claimed 
by the tyrant; that is to say in popular sovereignty, there are no self-owners. It should 
be obvious then, when an attempt is made to integrate the ideology of popular 
sovereignty with an ideology ofNatural Law/Natural Rights, contradiction is the 
inevitable result. The practical manifestation of this contradiction are the conflicts 
which arise as to which natural rights are to be respected and under which 
circumstances may natural rights be violated to provide which public goods as 
determined by an establishment of a popular sovereignty, which is precisely the 
ideological dilemma the Anti-Federalists faced. Similarly, Lord Action, commenting 
on the reception of the Natural Law theory of Grotius, wrote, " . . .  every settled 
authority, every triumphant interest recoiled aghast.. .. It was manifest that all persons 
who had learned that political science is an affair of conscience rather than of might 
and expediency, must regard their adversaries as men without principle." 132 
132 John Edward Emerich Dalberg-Acton, Essays on Freedom and Power (Glencoe, I l l . :  Free Press, 
1 948), 74. [Emphasis added] 
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Anti-Federalist respect for Natural Rights having ideological primacy over the 
claim of a popular sovereignty, while at the same time supporting that popular 
sovereignty put them in a very awkward philosophical position. The Anti-Federalist 
attempts to answer the questions provoked by attempting preserve the inviolability of 
natural rights or liberties if some must be given up for the public good, or how to give 
powers to the authorities, while preventing those authorities from having the powers 
that might swallow up those liberties, was the central problem that led to their being 
guilty of Hamilton's charge of contradiction. The Anti-Federalists were generally 
willing to concede some of the proper and legitimate ends of government but they 
were unwilling to agree further with the Federalists in allowing government to 
appropriate the means to supply those ends, as the means would necessitate or at least 
permit government to act aggressively, violating natural rights; a negation of the 
concession. 
It should not be considered too unusual that the Anti-Federalists found 
themselves caught in a contradiction of ideologies. The currents of history and its 
influence on culture provides an inheritance of a multitude of values, such that it is 
not uncommon to accept mutually exclusive ideas so long as they are intellectually 
compartmentalized or otherwise rationalized using external argumentation. Thomas 
Jefferson in an early draft of the Declaration of lndependence unthinkingly used to 
the term "fellow-subjects" in place of the finalized version using the term "fellow-
citizens". 1 33 A Maryland Farmer recognized this problem within the Anti-Federalist 
133 Library of Congress. "Hyperspectral lmaging by Library of Congress Reveals Change Made by 
Thomas Jefferson in Original Declaration of Independence Draft" Accessed from 
http://www.loc.gov/today/pr/20 I Oi l 0- 1 6 l .html on 20 I 0- 1 1 - 1 7. 
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ideology when he said, "These defects spring from our attempting to erect republican 
fabrics on the ruined and imperfect pillars of an old corrupt monarchy - not less 
absurd, than to expect the limbs to perform the functions of life, after cutting off the 
head." 134 The great majority of persons are not philosophers reasoning from first 
principles with the interest of logical consistency and linguistic precision and yet 
nearly all persons may properly recognize when they have been transgressed against; 
the ethical conclusions of Natural Rights theory are easily apprehended and the Anti-
Federalists were no exception to this condition. It was this apprehension that resulted 
in the Anti-Federalist reaction to the proposed Constitution; it was a projection of 
their fears on how the proposed Constitution might threaten violation of their natural 
rights based on their experiences and traditions ofhow governments historically 
operate. The political scientist Samuel Huntington expo sits the nature of the Anti-
Federalist difficulty in this way: 
No ideational theory can be used to defend existing institutions satisfactorily, 
even when those institutions in general reflect the values of that ideology. The 
perfect nature of the ideology's ideal and the imperfect nature and inevitable 
mutation of the institutions create a gap between the two. The ideal becomes 
a standard by which to criticize the institutions, much to the embarrassment of 
those who believe in the ideal and yet still wish to defend the institutions. 135 
It was never seriously in question that the Anti-Federalists held strongly to a 
theory ofNatural Rights but their internal contradiction was a result of their deviation 
of that Natural Rights theory due to their acceptance of external premises in the form 
ofhistorical traditions, namely that a person or group of persons must exist with the 
power to perform certain acts to provide for the public good. Who those persons are, 
134 Herbert Storing, The Anti-Federalist. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1 985) 5 . 1 .  73 . 
135 Samuel P. Huntington , "Conservatism as an Ideology," American Political Science Review (June 
1 957): 458-459. 
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how they should be selected, how much power they should have and which public 
goods should be produced from their powers were all in dispute. This analysis does 
not begin with those unexamined external premises but rather proceeds immediately 
from the ethic first established and then extended to the political sphere. If one 
cannot aggress against another individual on the basis that all are self-owners with 
inherent natural rights, there is no rationale to conclude that any group of persons 
may legitimately proceed against that person without their explicit consent; no 
political coalition or arrangement can use powers of force or coercion legitimately 
against an unwilling, unconsenting participant. 
This is the crux ofthe Anti-Federalist contradiction; they gave ideological 
primacy to a theory ofNatural Law/Natural Rights and yet accepted as an external 
proposition, the legitimacy of the State in the representative form of popular 
sovereignty. They were willing to concede that a state or government is a legitimate 
form of community cooperation that has for its purposes, legitimate ends, yet they 
could not, or were at least hesitant to, give the State the means to enforce those ends. 
They did not wish to give the State the means or powers that might occasion the 
violation of the natural rights of the subject, yet they conceded the legitimacy of the 
state and the legitimate ends of the state. The Anti-Federalists wished to deprive the 
general government to the means of power; they wished to divide the means (powers) 
to ensure that the general government would require the cooperation of the states in 
order to use the means of government. 1 36 
136 Such divisions sought by the Anti-Federalists include the separation of the power to tax with the 
power to direct military powers, the power to adjudicate legislation with juries who were to judge 
both the facts of the case and if necessary the law, effectively separating legislative powers between 
the representatives and the people as represented by local juries (a practice that often secured the 
liberties of Americans before the revolution against monarchical or parliamentary encroachment), 
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In the final analysis, the Federalists were also guilty of this same contradiction 
but the Federalist inconsistency is either, more complete, by permitting the alienation 
of the inalienable for the interest of the general welfare or public good, or else the 
Federalist gave the ideology of non-reciprocal ownership of others, ideological 
primacy and adding a theory of natural rights as an external premise. The Federalists 
in general seemed far more comfortable in giving the general government all the 
means of power to accomplish what they conceived to be the proper ends of 
government, with the implicit assumption of trust that the individuals composing the 
general government would have such virtue that there would seldom be any violations 
of natural rights. 137 In this analysis, it is incumbent upon historians to determine 
as well as the possibility of extra-legal action: " . . .  to grant all the great executive powers of a 
confederation, and a STANDING ARMY IN TIME OF PEACE, that grand engine of oppression, 
and moreover the absolute controul over the commerce of the United States and all external objects 
of revenue, such as unlimited imposts upon imports, etc. - they are to be vested every species of 
internal taxation; - whatever taxes, duties and excises that they may deem requisite for the general 
welfare . . .  would be enforced by the standing army . . .  "-Centinel 2.7. 1 1 ;  "they [the framers ofthe 
Constitution] propose to lodge in the general government very extensive power - powers nearly, if 
not altogether, complete and unlimited, over the purse and the sword."-The Federal Farmer 2.8.20; 
')ury trial ofthe vicinage, or the trial of fact in the neighborhood . . .  "-The Federal Farmer 2.8.53; 
"The trial by jury in criminal as well as in civil causes, has long been considered as one of our 
fundamental rights." -The Federal Farmer 2.8. 1 99; The people, aroused by, "the enlightened pen of 
patriotism," will, "assert their liberty, if necessary, by the sword. "-Centinel 2. 7 . 1 1 6; "State 
governments must stand and see the law take place; they may complain and petition - so may 
individuals; the members of them, in extreme cases, may resist, on the principles of self-defense -
so may the people and individuals."-The Federal Farmer 2 .8.2 1 1  [Herbert Storing, The Anti­
Federalist. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1 985)]; "arbitrary power may and ought to be 
resisted even by arms if necessary." -Cincinnatus [(Saul Cornell, The Other Founders. (The 
University of North Carolina Press, Williamsburg V.A. 1 999) 60.]. 
137 The Anti-Federalists would find that trusting to the virtue of the persons who would form the 
government would be an unsatisfactory guard against violations of natural rights: " . . .  men of the 
greatest purity of intention many be made instruments of despotism in the hands of the artful and 
designing."- Centinel, 2.7.3.; "Though this truth is proved by almost every page of the history of 
nations, to wit, that power, lodged in the hands of rulers to be used at discretion, is almost always 
exercised to the oppression of the people, and the aggrandizement of themselves; yet most men 
think if it was lodged in their hands they would not employ it in this manner."- Brutus 2.9.54. 
[Herbert Storing, The Anti-Federalist. {Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1 985)] . Also, the 
implicit assumption of trust, assumes that the representatives would be different in kind or different 
in virtue, than the people themselves; if representatives must be chosen by the people through 
electoral processes, then the people are assumed to have enough virtue to select those with 
sufficient virtue as not to become tyrannical over the people, yet the need for such a system 
necessarily implies that the people cannot be trusted to have sufficient virtue as to provide for their 
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whether the debate over the propriety of the Constitution was truly in regard to its 
ratification or some other alternative, or whether the true demarcation of what has 
been traditionally associated with the conceptual groupings of Federalists or Anti-
Federalists, was instead a public deliberation over the proper ideological primacy of 
Natural Rights, which the issue of ratification brought to the forefront. The Anti-
Federalists should not be considered as a defeated faction from American history; the 
Anti-Federalist tradition continues to this day in the extreme right and the extreme 
left of American politics - it is the tradition of dissent towards the powers and 
authority of governments; a tradition whose philosophical underpinnings is firmly 
entrenched in a theory ofNatural Rights. 
In closing, I observe. these words out of respect for the Anti-Federalist ideology 
and the possibility of an ethical interpretation of history through a theory of Natural 
Rights: 
"The more experience I acquire, the stronger is my conviction that unlimited 
power cannot be safety trusted to any man or set of men on earth. No men 
have undertaken to exercise authority with intention more generous and 
disinterested than the Congress . . . .  [How} could individuals blessed with 
peaceable domestic affluence . . .  endeavor at increasing the power with which 
they are invested, when their tenure of it must be exceedingly dangerous and 
precarious . . . ? This is a question I believe cannot be answered but by a plain 
declaration that power of all kinds has an irresistible propensity to increase 
desire for itself. It gives the passion of ambition a velocity which increases in 
its progress, and this is a passion which grows in proportion as it is gratified." 
-Thomas Burke ( 1777) 138  
"But the weight of opinion is against me when I exhort you never to debase 
the moral currency or to lower the standard of rectitude, but to try others by 
the final maxim that governs your own lives; and to suffer no man and no 
own determination of what would constitute, public goods. 
138 Murray Rothbard, Conceived in Liberty (Auburn AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1 999). vol. iv, 
246. 
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cause to escape the undying penalty which history has the power to inflict on 
wrong." -Lord Acton (1 906) 139 
139 John Edward Emerich Acton, Inaugural Lecture on the Study of History, ( 1 906). Accessed from 
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1 906acton.html on 201 0- 1 1 - 1 7. Ralph Raico, in his lecture 
"Classical Liberal Historians" (Auburn AL: History of Liberty Seminar, 200 I )  paraphrased these 
words of Acton 's as, "Don't easily exonerate any of the powerful persons in history. Push and push 
into the evidence and find the whole story." 
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Reflections on Researching the Anti-Federalists: 
. 
Praxeological and Natural Rights Implications for the Theory of History and 
Pedagogy 
72 
When the ideas of the "Anti-Federalists" are analyzed within the ideological 
context of praxeology and an ethical theory ofNatural Rights, or more properly, 
Natural Law, there are several significant implications that discursive reasoning will 
begin to reveal, about the theory and interpretation of history and accordingly, how 
history should be taught. What follows is a modest attempt to justify the use of a 
Natural Rights ethical theory in the interpretation of history and the corresponding 
implications for pedagogy. If as historians and educators, we are to permit in our 
theory of history and pedagogy, the assertion that all persons have inalienable ethical 
rights, based in their nature as rational beings, this may well have significant 
ramifications on how we interpret historical narratives. 
There is a sense· in which in consideration of "Anti-Federalist" sources, the 
inclusion of a Natural Rights theory is not mandated by the weight of the historical 
evidence alone; only a handful of the "Anti-Federalists" seem to be consciously 
aware of their use ofNatural Rights argumentation and even these, seem to fail to 
comprehend all the logical implications this theory would have, if applied more 
universally, to the states themselves. The writings of "Brutus", "Federal Farmer" and 
"A Columbian Patriot", as has been demonstrated, are sufficiently conscious of a 
Natural Rights theory in their own use of argumentation, to merit the call for attention 
to the relevance of such a theory in the understanding of the ideological import of 
their objections to the ratification of the Constitution, as it may concern our own 
historical understanding of their thoughts. 140 However, even if this were not the case, 
if the "Anti-Federalists" had never mentioned or implied a theory ofNatural Rights, 
140 Jacob Solt, "Reconciling Contradictions: Unraveling Anti-Federalist Ideology Through a 
Conceptual Framework of Natural Rights " (Rochester, NY: Unpublished, 20 I 0). 
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the use of such an analysis, may be justified by the need for some interpretive frame-
work for the synthesis of history, itself. 
Consider what a purported historical "narrative" might look like, if all ethical 
and praxeological frameworks were verboten; I suggest that such a narrative, could 
only recommend what evidence may be relevant (but even this would require an 
interpretive {subjective} framework, in the selection of a question, though not 
necessarily an ethical or praxeological one) and would consist of nothing more than a 
collection of footnotes, suggesting where possibly relevant evidence may be found. 
Such theoretical considerations should be carefully weighed by all historians, as few 
historians explicitly reveal their philosophical, ethical and praxeological assumptions, 
to their readers, and yet these assumptions when logically applied, dictate the 
interpretive framework, and therefore the great bulk of all derived interpretive 
conclusions. 141 
A history without a clear praxeology, would deny all intentional 
interpretations of personal action; no human action could be said to be the selection of 
means, for the purpose of realizing specific ends. Without a praxeological 
framework, history would be relegated to study human action in the same way that a 
geologist studies rock formations or in the way that a physicist studies atomic 
particles or celestial bodies. These objects of study, do not have 'preferences', they do 
not have 'purpose', they do not 'act' in any intentional sense; they react, or are acted 
141 "History cannot teach us any general rule, principle, or law. There is no means to abstract from a 
historical experience a posteriori any theories or theorems concerning human conduct and policies. 
The data of history would be nothing but a clumsy accumulation of disconnected occurrences, a 
heap of confusion, if they could not be clarified, arranged, and interpreted by systematic 
praxeological knowledge." - Ludwig von Mises, Human Action (San Francisco CA: Fox & 
Wilkes, 1 963) 4 1 .  
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upon in a deterministic sense. Only within the context of a praxeological framework, 
may we begin to make interpretive decisions as to the identification of means selected 
by actors to effect definitive preferred (subjective) ends in historical human action. 
Peter Boettke demonstrates the importance of a praxeological framework, in a 
thought-experiment, imagining an extra-terrestrial "Martian" with no understanding 
of human thought, observing the events at Grand Central Station of New York city 
and attempting to analyze the 'data': 
"Our Martian could observe that when the little hand on the clock points to 
eight, there is a bustle of movement as bodies leave these boxes, and that 
when the little hand hits five, there is a bustle of movement as bodies re-enter 
the boxes and leave. The Martian may even develop a prediction about the 
little hand [of the clock] and the movement of bodies and boxes. But unless 
the Martian comes to understand the purposes and plans (the commuting to 
and from work}; his 'scientific' understanding of the data from Grand Central 
Station would be limited. The sciences of human action are different from the 
natural sciences, and we impoverish the human sciences when we try to force 
them into the philosophical/scientific mold of the natural sciences." 142 
It is certainly possible, within a purely praxeological framework, which is to 
say, a praxeological framework of interpretation that does not have any ethical 
assumptions, to construct a coherent historical narrative and would permit the most 
value-free of historical analyses. With such an analysis, we could make judgements 
about whether the particular means selected by a particular individual, was productive 
142 Peter Boettke, Handbook on Contemporary Austrian Economics (Northampton MA: Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited, 201 0) xii. 
[Murray Rothbard recounted Ludwig von Mises' account of this thought experiment: " . . . the 
difference between two fundamental ways of approaching human behavior was in looking at Grand 
Central Station behavior during rush hour. The 'objective' or 'truly scientific' behaviorist, he pointed 
out, would observe the empirical events: e.g., people rushing back and forth, aimlessly at certain 
predictable times of day. And that is all he would know. But the true student of human action would 
start from the fact that all human behavior is purposive, and he would see the purpose is to get from 
home to the train to work in the morning, the opposite at night, etc. It is obvious which one would 
discover and know more about human behavior, and therefore which one would be the genuine 
'scientist.' " Ludwig von Mises, Theory and History (Auburn AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 
2007), xvi.] 
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or unproductive in the attainment of the preferred end-state that that individual 
intended to produce in the world. In such a case, it would be a purely speculative and 
theoretical matter to suggest that other means would have been more productive or 
less productive, for the attainment of those chosen ends; and no judgement 
whatsoever could be made on the appropriateness of the preferred end-state. Such a 
historical analysis would be most concerned with source material indicating possible 
ideas held by the individual in question (the premises or axioms accepted by the 
individual, rationalizing the individual's conclusions), the preferred end-state or 
preferred outcomes of the individual (subjective preferences), and the means selected 
to produce the outcomes desired. 143 Therefore, in a purely praxeological historical 
analysis, only the means selected, as represented by the actions taken by a particular 
individual, would be both relevant and objectively verifiable to the historical 
narrative. 
It is my opinion however, that the pure praxeological interpretation of history 
is generally unsatisfactory for most people. A purely praxeological interpretation 
cannot exceed the judgements of the historical subject, as any further judgement or 
interpretation, being beyond the ken of the historical subject herself, must function in 
the application of some other external principle or framework. A purely 
praxeological interpretation, removes, as much as is possible, the ability for the 
historian or student of history, to respond to the sources as they construct a historical 
143 Note that the former two conditions would generally only be found in the individual's own recorded 
statements, as these conditions are particular to the individual's own mind, which is only available 
to inspection, inasmuch as the individual has made expression of their own thoughts (evidence 
which is always suspect to conditions of possible deception). Only the last condition is readily 
accessible to the historian as the means selected by the individual, are represented by the actions 
taken by said individual, which may be corroborated and verified by multiple sources. 
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narrative, as the praxeological historical narrative is only concerned with the actions 
of the historical subject (individual) as they relate to the subject's intentions (relative 
to the subject's subjective preferences). 
While there might be an argument to be made for such a nearly "value-free" 
historical construction, there are also strong indications that such a historical narrative 
may be perceived by the author and the reader alike, to be rather wooden and flat; 
dimensions of understanding that come from the personal-subjective response to the 
evidence in primary sources would be absent. 144 The author, Ayn Rand 
correspondingly wrote: "You must write that which you consider good, to the best of 
your judgment, taste and ability. There is no other rule or standard to go by. " 145 If in 
the attempt to create such a value-free historical construction, we are to deem as 
significant/relevant to the historical narrative, the actions taken by the historical 
subject based on her subjective preferences, there is a worthy case to be made that 
this is an entirely conceptual and theoretical mode, divorcing the thinking mind from 
its own subjectivity; that the act of constructing the historical narrative in the first 
place, begs the question, and the action of such (creating the narrative) is a selected 
means that we (historians) are using to create a preferred end-state based on our own 
subjective preferences. Therefore, I contend that this being the case, we rather should 
and in reality do, appropriately apply our subjective preferences in the construction of 
historical narratives by our evaluations and responses to the source material and our 
144 Robert Marzano & Debra Pickering, Dimensions of Learning (Aurora CO: McREL, 1 997) 1 89-259, 
234. 
145 Micheal S. Berliner, Letters of Ayn Rand (New York NY: Penguin Books USA Inc., 1 997) 1 5 1 .  
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only responsibility in doing so, is to be honest and forthright with our audience and 
confess our premises that direct our interpretive/theoretical frameworks. 
In this spirit, I will put forward, what I believe is my implicit assumptions or 
premises that likely lead to my conclusions about the appropriateness of adopting a 
Natural Right theory in the construction and analysis of history. The first premise 
that is necessary for a Natural Rights theory is that human persons, have free-will 
(that human persons make meaningful choices) . The second premise, that human 
persons have intrinsic rights, in and of themselves as ethical beings, (that all human 
persons have equally relevant ethical standing to make ethical claims). The third and 
last premise being, that personal, private property is a necessary human right (that the 
concept of personal, private property is ethically, meaningful and legitimate). 
While it would be a simple matter to merely request that these assumptions be 
given for the purposes of argumentation, it is worthwhile to provide some defense of 
these premises. Perhaps the most effective means of defending these premises, is to 
deny the premises for the purposes of argumentation and then reason the conclusions 
that are derived from that denial; if the conclusions derived from the denial of an 
ethical premise, creates an ethically unsatisfactory result (which ultimately, only our 
subjective preferences may resolve), then we are then left to deny the denial, resulting 
in the assertion our original premise. The denial of the first premise, would be to 
deny that human persons make meaningful choices. If human persons do not make 
meaningful choices, this means that they do not control their thoughts and actions of 
themselves, but that they are controlled by forces, unknown and unknowable. The 
assertion of the premise that human persons do not make meaningful choices, 
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contradicts the very notion of ethics, entirely; it would not be meaningful to say that a 
person 'should' act in a way and not in some other way, if the 'person' in question does 
not have control or the volition to act differently. The acceptance of such a 
philosophical determinism, results in a denial of the fundamental praxeological 
foundations and assumptions, and logically reduces human action, to something that 
merely is, rather than as a means to attain desired ends. The denial that persons make 
meaningful choices is an ethically unsatisfactory outcome in my own subjective 
determination, and therefore I deny the denial and accept the first premise. 
The denial that human persons have rights, in and of themselves (that their 
rights are somehow intrinsic to their very nature as rationaVethical entities), asserts an 
ethical theory that places its ethical determination, extrinsically of ethical actors. 
There are many possibilities on the loci and justification this extrinsic designation 
may imply (utilitarianism, cultural relativity, subjective relativity, etc.) but what is of 
consequence to the denial of the second premise, is that harm to any particular 
individual may be justified as irrelevant or inconsequential to the ethical analysis, 
when the loci of ethics is extrinsic to the individual . The most severe and extreme of 
these possible consequences, is the possibility of the ethical justification of slavery 
and other forms of individual sacrifice for the preferences of another. When the locus 
of ethics is extrinsic to the individual, such that the individual has no intrinsic rights 
to herself, then it is of no consideration that the 'slave' may say of the 'master', "You 
do wrong, unto me" or for the 'slave' to say, "She violates my right to liberty, by using 
the threat of violence to coerce me to labor, for another, under conditions of duress." 
If persons do not have rights, intrinsically to their persons, than however other 
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admirable the alternative ethical foundation, the inevitable result will be that in some 
cases (if not all) human persons are to be treated as solely means to arrive at some 
other extrinsic end and not ends unto themselves. 146 The treatment of another person 
as a means only, to execute a desired end, is to diminish the humanity of that person 
as an ethical being; it is to treat people, in the same way we treat material objects, to 
serve a purpose and to be discarded when its purpose no longer serves. The denial 
that persons have rights intrinsic to their status as ethical/rational beings, results in the 
ethically unsatisfactory outcome, that some persons are not entitled to humanity, and 
may be treated as means solely for the purposes of whatever proposed ends, and 
consequently, I deny the denial of the second premise. 
The denial of the third premise, that personal, private property is not a 
necessary human right or that the concept of personal, private property is not ethically 
legitimate or that its meaning is substantially circumscribed, would seem to imply 
that the appropriation of resources for the exclusive use of an individual, must either 
be ethically illegitimate or meaningfully circumscribed. If it is illegitimate for a 
person to appropriate material resources or goods for exclusive personal use, then this 
would seem to imply that the act of eating or drinking itself would be illegitimate. As 
it would be queer indeed, if the requirements of life for an ethical being would 
146 I t  is possible that the essential idea of our second premise may, in fact be reduced to Kant's 
'Categorical Imperative', that "the rational being himself [should], be never employed merely as 
means, but as the supreme condition restricting the use of all means, that is in every case as an end 
likewise." Abbott, Thomas Kingsmill, Kant s Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the 
Theory of Ethics, (London: Kongmans, Green and Co., I 889) Accessed at: 
http://files.Iibertyfund.org/files/360/Kant 02 I 2 EBk v6.0.pdf on 1 1  -I 0-20 1 1 .  An alternative 
formulation of Kant's 'Humanity' form of the 'Categorical Imperative': "Now, I say, man and, in 
general, every rational being exists as an end in himself and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily 
used by this or that will. In all his actions, whether they are directed toward himself or toward 
other rational beings, he must always be regarded at the same time as an end." Louis P. Pojman, 
Ethical Theory (Belmont CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1 998), 305 
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themselves be unethical, resulting in the conclusion, that it is unethical that an ethical 
being should subsist, I therefore deny the contention that it is illegitimate for any 
individual to acquire personal private property to the exclusion of others. 
If the second contention is denied, that there is no meaningful restriction on 
the legitimate acquisition of private property (that property may acquired by laboring 
under natural conditions {home-steading} or trade), such a denial would imply a 
meaningful circumscription or restriction to the acquisition of private property 
(legitimate exclusive use of material goods). This denial would seem to implicate 
that persons must in some sense, be able to use material resources for their own 
legitimate exclusive use, at least for subsistence and perhaps other uses but in some 
case or sense, the denial would limit or restrict the kinds of property or kinds of 
acquisition of property that may be ethically 'owned'. Such a contention would 
therefore imply that some forms of property or acquisitions of same, would lack the 
ethical status of a right. Where the specific bifurcation between the legitimate kinds 
property or acquisition is likely to be arbitrarily defined and there are many possible 
permutations for the demarcation of when the private appropriation of material goods 
may cross the line of definition from a legitimate 'ownership' to an illegitimate 
acquisition of 'property'. It may be useful to examine one such example of a 
circumscription on the ethical analysis of property. 
One of the more notable thinkers that deny the legitimacy of 'property' is 
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon; Proudhon argued for a theory of justice, which would deny 
the legitimacy of certain kinds of private property, as Proudhon felt that it 
necessitated the result of material inequality (and hence, for Proudhon, an injustice). 
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For Proudhon, the goods that one produces with one's own labor, is properly the 
possession of that person but those goods/resources which are the result of corporate 
labor, are corporate goods and cannot be owned by particular individuals as a 
'possession'. 
Prouhon distinguishes between: 
"Property pure and simple, the dominant and seigniorial power over a thing; 
or, as they term it, naked property" [for Proudhon, an illegitimate form of 
property] and a, "Possession . . . .  The tenant, the farmer, the commandite, the 
usufructuary, are possessors" [a legitimate form of property] ; "the owner who 
lets and lends for use, the heir who is to come into possession on the death of 
a usufructuary, are proprietors."  [illegitimate] " . . .  This double defmition of 
property -- domain and possession -- is of the highest importance; and it must 
be clearly understood . . .  "147 
In Proudhon's formulatipn of property, the farmer and artisan could 'possess' the 
results and production of her own labor, which she properly and legitimately owns 
but such a formulation would not permit the ownership of capital goods and resources 
(like factories), which Proudhon identifies as an illegitimate acquisition of the 
productive power of labor. 1 48 
Proudhon's ideas demonstrates just one of the possible demarcations between 
the bifurcation of the more common sense of property, into a concept of 'property' 
147 
148 
Pierre Joseph Proudhon, "What is Property? An Inquiry into the Principle of Right and of 
Government " (New York NY: Humboldt Publishing Company, 1 890) 43. Accessed 1 1 - 1 0-20 1 1  at 
http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccer-new2? 
id=ProProp.sgm&images=images/modeng&data=/texts/english/modeng/parsed&tag=public&part= 
Jill Proudhon quotes Dranton and Toullier in this same passage: "Possession,' says Duranton, 'is a 
matter of fact, not of right.' Toullier: 'Property is a right, a legal power; possession is a fact."' 
"Under the law of association, transmission of wealth does not apply to the instruments of 
labour, so cannot become a cause of inequality ... We are socialists ... under universal association, 
ownership of the land and of the instruments of labour is social ownership . . .  We want the mines, 
canals, railways handed over to democratically organised workers' associations . . .  We want these 
associations to be models for agriculture, industry and trade, the pioneering core of that vast 
federation of companies and societies, joined together in the common bond of the democratic and 
social Republic." -Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. 'Oeuvres Completes' (Lacroix edition), volume 1 7, 
pages 1 88-9. 
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which is legitimate (property as 'possession'), and one which is not (property as 
'domain'). While Proudhon's bifurcation of property, is not untenable, the philosophic 
anchor to what is legitimate property (possession), being located in the personal 
expenditure of labor to produce it (labor theory of value), would be economically 
conducive to fairly primitive economic organizations, where self-sufficiency is of 
primary necessity, but Proudhon's theory would be fairly limiting to more complex 
economic organization, in which the specialization of labor permits exponentially 
greater efficiency in the satisfaction of human wants/desires. 149 In as much as I do not 
perceive the actions of trade between persons, as illegitimate, and the complex 
economic organization, such as in factories, are differences in the measure of the 
complexity of trade between persons and not a difference in kind, I would reject the 
contention that, the meaning of property as the material resources, acquired through 
the mixture of labor with natural resources (home-steading) and through 
voluntary/consensual trade between persons, for private and exclusive use, is thence 
circumscribed or restricted. This rejection of Proudhon's theory is hardly a foregone 
conclusion, and it expresses more of a subjective preference of theoretical insight on 
149 Certainly Proudhon thought that his theory allowed for complex economic organization, as he 
would would have the laborers of a factory, its owners; preserving the idea that one only 
legitimately owns, on what one labors. A thorough account of why this allocation of property right 
would result in sever reductions in production may be found in Ludwig von Mises' "Fallacies of 
Syndicalism". Essentially, Mises identifies that in free-market scenario, the entrepreneur is forced 
to anticipate and respond to the market-forces of consumer demand, in order to compete and 
remain solvent. This control that the consumer demand has over the entrepreneur owner of a 
factory, Mises identifies and consumer-sovereignty. The replacement of the entrepreneur, with a 
federation of workers in collective ownership, would have the economic tendency to respond less 
to market-forces of consumer demand and more on individual apportionment of the collective 
ownership, tending to an unsustainable producer sovereignty (tragedy of the commons). A workers 
collective then, would neither have the same motivation, the same willingness to accept the risk of 
new market-ventures, nor the same ski II, as the entrepreneur, in the anticipation and response to 
market-forces. Ludwig von Mises ( 1 963) Human Action (San Francisco CA: Fox & Wilkes) 8 1 3-
14 .  
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my own part, than a substantive refutation; Proudhon's theory of property remains 
tenable for anyone advocating a more or less self-sufficient life, suppling all of their 
needs by means of their own labor. As Ludwig von Mises has written: 
It is obvious that this controversy cannot be settled by appeal to historical 
experience. With regard to the establishment of the facts there is no 
disagreement between the two groups. Their antagonism concerns the 
interpretation of events, and this interpretation must be guided by the theory 
chosen. The epistemological and logical considerations which determine the 
correctness or incorrectness of a theory are logically and temporally 
antecedent to the elucidation of the historical problem involved. The historical 
facts as such neither prove nor disprove any theory. They need to be 
interpreted in the light of theoretical insight. 150 
Therefore, these three initial premises, defended as modestly as they are here, 
if accepted, concludes that rational individuals are by their very nature, ethical entities 
(free-will), that have the locus of their rights intrinsic to their status as ethical beings, 
and that among their rights, is the ownership or domain to their own body (life) and to 
their property, acquired through nature (home-steading), or trade. The right, 
ownership or domain to use one's property (whether one's own body or external 
property) as one sees proper, as long as the action does not conflict with another 
person's rights (liberty), is the philosophic essence of Locke's theory ofNatural 
Rights, "life, liberty and property". 
[E]very man has a property in his own person. This nobody has any right to 
but himself. The labour of his body and the work of his hands, we may say, are 
properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath 
provided, an left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it 
something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him 
removed from the common state nature placed it in, it hath by this labour 
something annexed to it that excludes the common right of other men. 1 5 1  
150 Ludwig von Mises, Human Action (San Francisco CA: Fox & Wilkes, 1 963) 622. 
151  John Locke, An Essay Conerning the True Origin, Extent, and End of Civil Government, Y., in Two 
Treatises of Government, P. Laslett, ed . . (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 960) 27-28. 
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Hopefully, this philosophical exposition of the fundamental interpretive framework, is 
not too much to bear under the topic of history and pedagogy, but as these are the 
theoretical and ethical assumptions that have been selected as the basis for an 
interpretive frame-work to analyze the "Anti-Federalists", and as it has been argued 
that historians ought to reveal their premises, it was thought best to model the 
proposition suggested. 
Up until this time, "Anti-Federalist" has been placed in quotations to 
emphasize that the propriety of the reference; had not yet been established. The 
denomination of "Anti-Federalist" was not a term that was generally accepted as a 
term of self-identification by the so called "Anti-Federalists" themselves, and 
therefore represents a naming convention, not accepted by (most) of those, so named. 
As Pauline Maier points out, "I prefer not to use the word 'Anti-Federalist' since it 
was a Federalist term of opprobrium" and that Maier believes that, "seeing the contest 
as between two sides is misleading" as, "it suggests other dichotomies, such as 'for' 
and 'against'." 152 This kind of objection to the term, respects the manifold 
divergence of historical evidence and respects the praxeological tenet, discerned by 
Ludwig von Mises, that only individuals act, and that this unit of analysis is the most 
pertinent to the construction of the historical narrative: 
The hangman, not the state, executes a criminal. It is the meaning of those 
concerned that discerns in the hangman's action an action of the state. A 
group of armed men occupies a place. It is the meaning of those concerned 
which imputes this occupation not to the officers and soldiers on the spot, but 
to their nation. If we scrutinize the meaning of the various actions performed 
by individuals we must necessarily learn everything about the actions of 
collective wholes. For a social collective has no existence and reality outside 
of the individual members' actions. The life of a collective is lived in the 
152 Pauline Maier Personal Correspondence with Jacob Soft (Unpublished, 20 1 1 )  
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actions of the individuals constituting its body. There is no social collective 
conceivable which is not operative in the actions of some individuals. The 
reality of a social integer consists in its directing and releasing definite actions 
on the part of individuals. Thus the way to a cognition of collective wholes is 
through an analysis of the individuals' actions. 1 53 
Therefore, it is in this sense that generalizations attributed to the "Anti-Federalists", 
indeed even the use of the "Anti-Federalist" designation is to dabble in inaccuracies. 
It would be more accurate to treat each "Anti-Federalist" as a unique person, with a 
set of ideas that can only be described as peculiar to her; a person who changes 
through time, whose actions compose one strand in the tapestry of history, which 
itself is unique and non-repeatable weave. 
While recognizing the clarity of conceptual focus of this basic praxeological 
tenet, it should be noted that generalizations have utilitarian uses and are pragmatic 
conceptual tools. Generalizations and conceptual groupings abstract similar concepts 
together for the purposes of conceptual simplicity, and it is that simplification of the 
complex and multifarious, that makes such generalizations useful. Therefore, I will 
hence refer to those known as the "Anti-Federalists", without further quotations, in 
reference to a rough conceptual grouping of individuals who had in one fashion or 
another, opposed the ratification of the Constitution. Inasmuch as all proper names 
are arbitrary symbolic references of language and inasmuch as the original 
'opprobrium' hardly lingers in the current cultural sensitivities, this naming 
convention should not be viewed as a veiled attempt at disrespect; only a pragmatic 
decision to avoid unnecessary confusion of renaming the denominal convention, or 
resorting in all cases, to individually referencing the specific members in the set. 
153 Ludwig von Mises Human Action (San Francisco CA: Fox & Wilkes, 1 963) 42. "First we must 
realize that all actions are performed by individuals." 42. 
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If it is not possible to interpret history objectively, due to "history's incurable 
subjectivity", then it would preferable to explicitly accept an ideological framework 
for the interpretation of historical sources. 1 54 The adoption of an explicit ethical 
theory to interpret Anti-Federalist sources made it possible to abstract a general 
theory (Natural Rights) informing the ideological reasons for the Anti-Federalists' 
dissent in my own research and may similarly help students use inductive reasoning 
processes, for rule-making, rule-adaptation, and environmental modeling, to construct 
their own frameworks of interpretation. 1 55 An ethical theory explicitly selected and 
philosophically justified, creates an interpretive tool, by which information may be 
constructed into a cohesive whole by, "recognizing patterns . . .  [in the] less-obvious 
general patterns in specific information we see and hear and then using these general 
patters to see similarities between blocks of information that at first seem to be quite 
different". 1 56 Using ethical frameworks in the interpretation of historical narratives 
has a powerful chance to fulfill Marzano's challenge of using knowledge 
meaningfully, "The challenge is to engage learners in using knowledge in a context 
that is meaningful to them."1 57 If students feel that they may legitimately make 
ethical determinations that are philosophically justified, then they may be more 
engaged in the process of creating historical narratives, as they are actively 
participating in an important part of the interpretive process. 
154 J .A. Passmore, "The Objectivity of History". Philosophy, Vol. 33, No. 1 25 (Apr., 1 958), pp. 97- l l l .  
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Royal lnstitute of Philosophy. I l l .  
155 John H .  Holland, et a/., Induction: Processes of Inference, Learning and Discovery (Cambridge 
MA: MIT Press, 1 987) 
156 Robert J .  Marzano & Debra J. Pickering, Dimensions of Learning (Aurora CO: McREL, 1 997) 
1 30. 
157 Ibid. 1 89. [It may be significant to point out that hard determinism, cultural subjectivism or 
personal subjectivism, may have the opposite effect, as these may have the tendency to make 
ethical interpretations less meaningful.] 
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The use of an ethical framework for the interpretation of historical events is to 
simplify the complex, by using a theory that dictates the legitimate and illegitimate 
interactions of just a few individuals and then extending that ethical theory to more 
complex relationships with a great number of individuals. Seen this way, the normal 
political analysis so familiar in forming of historical narratives is sublimated into, or 
is transformed by, the ethical analysis. The historian Lord Acton exhorted his 
students to similarly use the (ethical) maxims that governed their own lives, to try the 
actions of historical actors, when �e said in his inaugural lecture on history: 
But the weight of opinion is against me when I exhort you never to debase the 
moral currency or to lower the standard of rectitude, but to try others by the 
final maxim that governs your own lives, and to suffer no man and no cause to 
escape the undying penalty which history has the power to inflict on wrong. 
The plea in extenuation of guilt and mitigation of punishment is perpetual. At 
every step we are met by arguments which go to excuse, to palliate, to 
confound right and wrong, and reduce the just man to the level of the 
reprobate. The men who plot to baffle and resist us are, first of all, those who 
made history what it has become. They set up the principle that only a foolish 
Conservative judges the present time with the ideas of the past; that only a 
foolish Liberal judges the past with the ideas of the present. The mission of 
that school was to make distant times, and especially the Middle Ages, then 
most distant of all, intelligible and acceptable to a society issuing from the 
eighteenth century. There were difficulties in the way; and among others this, 
that, in the first fervour of the Crusades the men who took the Cross, after 
receiving communion, heartily devoted the day to the extermination of Jews. 
To judge them by a fixed standard, to call them sacrilegious fanatics or furious 
hypocrites, was to yield a gratuitous victory to Voltaire. It became a rule of 
policy to praise the spirit when you could not defend the creed. So that we 
have no common code: our moral notions are always fluid; and you must 
consider the times, the class from which men sprang, the surrounding 
influences, the masters in their schools, the preachers in their pulpits, the 
movement they obscurely obeyed, and so on, until responsibility is merged in 
numbers, and not a culprit is left for execution. A murderer was no criminal if 
he followed local custom, if neighbours approved, ifhe was encouraged by 
official advisers or prompted by just authority, if he acted for the reason of 
state or the pure love of religion, or if he sheltered himself behind the 
complicity of the Law . . . .  My principles enable me to form my judgment upon 
men and actions in history, just as they do in common life; and are not formed 
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out of events and characters, either present or past. History is a preceptor of 
prudence, not of principles. The principles of true politics are those of 
morality enlarged; and I neither now do, nor ever will admit of any other. 158 
If we may take Acton's incitement to practical effect, we must acknowledge our own 
ethical premises, and respond to history with those premises, and in such way, we 
engage honestly in historical interpretation. 
This process of using ethical frameworks to judge the interpretive legitimacy 
of historical narratives, also permits students to test or try, different ethical theories, 
to see which ones result in acceptable ethical conclusions and which ones result in 
absurdities. This use of ethical frameworks would seem to have direct relevance to 
Marzano's research that shows the efficacy of pedagogic techniques which utilize the 
generating and testing ofhypotheses. 159 In this instance, the ethical framework, may 
be viewed as the hypothetical, which is testing if the application of the theory to the 
interpretation of history leads to personally satisfactory ethical outcomes. If the 
ethical outcomes from applying an ethical theory, leads to paradoxical or absurd 
conclusions which require particular exceptions to be made in the universalization of 
the ethic, then this would indicate that the hypothesis may require revision. 
158 John Edward Emerich Acton ( 1 906) "Inaugural Lecture on the Study of History" Accessed from 
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1 906acton.html on 201  I - I I - I 7. Ralph Raico, in his lecture 
"Classical Liberal Historians" (Auburn AL: History of Liberty Seminar, 2001 ), paraphrased those 
words of Acton's as, "Don't easily exonerate any of the powerful persons in history. Push and push into 
the evidence and find the whole story." 
159 Robert Marzano, et al., Classrooms Instruction that Works. (Denver CO: MeRe!, 200 1 )  1 03 .  
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The Anti-Federal ists used Natural Rights theory to criticize the Constitution, 
as the Constitution appeared to them, a document which could support the violations 
of individual Natural Rights. For some of the more principled of the Anti-Federalists,  
the principle purpose for the f01mi ng of society, is the additional protection of one's 
own Natural R ights in a social community, as opposed to the security in a state of 
nature. As Mercy Otis Warren (A Columbian Patriot) would write variously, "the 
principle aim of society is to protect individuals in the absolute rights which were 
vested in them by the immediate laws of nature" and, "the rights of individuals ought 
to be the primary object of a l l  government" and, "government is  instituted for the 
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protection, safety, and happiness of the people." 160 This very same sentiment would 
be elucidated by Brutus when he would write: 
. . .  they hold this truth as self-evident, that all men are by nature free. No one 
man, therefore, or any class of men, have a right by the law of nature, or of 
God, to assume or exercise authority over their fellows. The origin of society 
then is to be sought, not in any natural right which one man has to exercise 
authority over another, but in the united consent of those who associate. 1 61 
For Brutus and Warren, any application of the Constitution which would violate the 
Natural Rights of individuals, would de legitimize the reason for the creation of the 
Constitution in the first place. This use of argumentation is the use of ethical theory 
to deconstruct political organization, in the same way that St. Augustine would do 
when he wrote, "An unjust law, is no law at all."162 
Whereas the Anti-Federalists can be seen as making the Lockean ethical 
argument, the Federalists seem to be making an contrasting Hobbesian political 
argument, which has much explanatory power in understanding their fundamental 
ideological differences. The Federalists can be seen as essentially transferring the 
Divine Right of monarchical sovereignty, to the concept of popular sovereignty. This 
ideological transference results in the smuggling of the ideological premise that 
ethically legitimates the 'right' of one person to rule another person, or persons; a 
contention that can not be admitted to an ethic that attributes inalienable rights to 
individuals. Anti-Federalists like Brutus and Warren, could not ideologically permit 
the so-called, 'popular sovereignty' to manifestly deny the rational nature of 
160 Saul Cornell, The Other Founders: (The University of North Carolina Press, Williamsburg Y.A. 
1 999) 56. 
161  Herbert Storing, The Anti-Federalist. (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1 985). 2.9.24. 44lbid. 
2.9.24. 
1 62 Augustine, On Free Choice Of The Will, Book 1 :  5. trans. Thomas Williams (Cambridge: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1 993), 8. 
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individuals by allowing it to initiate aggression, coercion or theft - contrary to the 
voluntary consent of individuals. 
In conclusion, if it is not possible to interpret history without assumed 
praxeological and ethical frameworks, then we would do well if we were to make 
those assumed premises explicit to our readers and our students. This will require 
that as historians and teachers, we must also be part-philosophers and delve into the 
ideological assumptions that we bring to the construction of historical narratives; and 
if such an approach can be recommended to educators, it would also have value for 
students. The application of ethical theories, especially the Natural Right theory has 
the potential for inviting students to have greater engagement in the process of 
creating historical narratives, by justifying their own natural inclination to 
universalize ethics and appealing to their great concern for justice and fairness. 163 
As educators of the social studies, we are entrusted to share the value of the 
humanities, including philosophy and ethics, and perhaps through a fuller integration 
of the humanities into our historical studies, we will assist students to more richly 
understand history. 
"In a battle between force and an idea, the later always prevails . . . .  
Repression by brute force is always a confession of the inability to 
make use of the better weapons of the intellect - better because they 
alone give promise of final success . . . .  The ultimate outcome of the 
struggle, however, will not be decided by arms, but by ideas. It is 
ideas that group men into fighting factions, that press the weapons 
into their hands, and that determine against whom and for whom the 
weapons shall be used. It is they alone, and not arms, that, in the last 
analysis, tum the scales." 
-Ludwig von Mises 164 
163 Claudia Dalbert & Hedvig Sallay, The Justice Motive in Adolescence and Young Adulthood: 
Origins and Consequences. (New York NY: Routledge, 2004) 1 1 7. 
164 Ludwig von Mises Liberalism (Indianapolis IN :  Liberty Fund Inc., 2005) 29. 
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Reflections on Research Dissemination: 
A Beginners Foray into AudioNideo Production and Social Media Promotion 
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When tasked with the purpose of disseminating my research on the Anti-
Federalists, my first thought was to emulate the great resources I had discovered on 
iTunes University and various iTunes Podcasts. I had originally purchased an iPod to 
listen to my favorite Bluegrass and Folk music but after discovering the field of what 
was available by individuals producing their own pseudo-radio programs and from 
iTunes University, my iPod was promptly repurposed. I found that I could load a 
lecture on history or philosophy from Yale or Oxford universities and then listen to it 
on a hike along the Genesee river in the city of Rochester, or while mulching the 
garden, or even something as mundane as doing the laundry. The primary reason I 
valued the content from these sources was due to the mobility of the content. The 
value of consuming ideas as rich and as complex, as can generally only be found 
while spending dedicated time reading, was tremendously significant to me; listening 
to my iPod was a significant enhancement to time normally spent with just my own 
thoughts; I wanted my research dissemination to be equally accessible and mobile. 
When I began the project, I was aware of a few resources on iTunes about the 
Anti-Federalists. Libravox has a significant amount of the primary source material of 
the Anti-Federalists which have been recorded primarily by volunteers and published 
to iTunes. 1 65 In a similar fashion, Wyn Delano, actor, singer, and director, has read 
aloud the chapters of the advanced placement, U.S. history text book, The American 
Pageant as an iTunes publication and a portion of chapter ten includes mention of the 
Anti-Federalists. 1 66 Ms. Scott, of Ms. Scott's JH History podcast, gives her own four 
165 LibriVox (2007-201 0) The Anti-Federalist Papers http://librivox.org/ Accessed at 
http://itun.es/iLd6BL on 1 2-0 1 -20 1 1 
166 Wyn Delano (2008) "The American Pageant, Chapter I 0" Accessed at http://itun.es/iLd66w on 1 2-
0 1 -20 1 1 .  http://web.me.com/wyndelano/Wyn Delano/Podcast/Podcast.html 
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minute synthesis of the Federalist/Anti-Federalist debates on iTunes. 1 67 Interestingly, 
one of the earliest references to the Anti-Federalists on iTunes that I am aware of is 
from the Life of a Law Student podcast; Rob Wiltbank gives a fifteen minute lecture 
about the Federalist/Anti-Federalist debates and its significance on Constitutional law 
in 2005. 1 68 One of the best resources on iTunes regarding the Anti-Federalists, is 
professor Luigi Marco Bassani's lectures in the History of Liberty lecture series that 
was given at the Ludwig von Mises Institute in 2004. 1 69 Professor Bassani's lectures 
are particularly fascinating in relation to my own research because Bassani makes a 
similar connection of the Anti-Federalist arguments to a Natural Law theory of ethics, 
that I make in my own research thesis. 
Because of the value I had found in mobile audio podcasts, I was very 
interested in producing my own content for an online audience and the requirement to 
disseminate my research seemed a sufficient impetus to create the opportunity to 
attempt this then-mysterious podcasting-feat. An equipment upgrade was needed to 
be able to do to the video-capture and video-processing but after the computer, digital 
video recorder, digital audio recorder and appropriate software was obtained, I needed 
to create some digital content with which I could begin to learn to manipulate that 
content for internet publication. With that first simple digital audio recorder, I began 
to record a few of the conversations I had with people of my acquaintance on the bus 
during my commute to work and at my place of employment during work-breaks, in 
1 67 Ms. Scott (20 1 0) "Federalists and Anti-Federalists Review" Accessed at http://itun.es/ild66P on 
1 2-0 1 -20 1 1 .  
168 Rob Wiltbank (2005) "Constitutional Law I #2: Federalists and Anti-Federalists" (LoaLS Team) 
Accessed at http://itun.es/iLd6gM on 09- 1 0-20 1 1 .  
169 Luigi Marco Bassani (2004) "Anti-Federalist Traditions until the Civil War" in History of Liberty 
(Ludwig von Mises Institute) Accessed at httv://itun.es/iLd6L2 on 09- 1 0-20 1 1 .  
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order to have some digital audio files available to use as a test of my equipment, 
software and research. In the process of recording these very informal discussions, I 
quickly discovered that casual conversations, while interesting in their various 
divergences, are often difficult to keep on a single topic and that it was clear that a 
more formal discussion would be required. The problem that I soon encountered was 
that as long as I was recording· casual conversations for a "school project" on the 
general topic of the "Anti-Federalists", people were more than happy to chat and 
discuss various topics, but when trying to create a more formal and topical discussion 
with the explicit intention for publication to the internet, many people immediately 
felt uncomfortable speaking about a topic for which they did not have much 
background knowledge and which was going to be made available publicly. 
While I could empathize with my potential participants' discomfort about 
discussing a topic with which they had little background information, since the 
primary topics I wished to discuss were the political, historical and ethical ideas of 
the Anti-Federalists that were essentially philosophical in character, the actual 
historical background seemed less critical in contrast with the need to actually think 
critically regarding the ideas, that I had thought that even non-historians could easily 
engage the content that I was interested in discussing. At the same time, it was 
becoming clear to me that this lack of background information was an issue for many 
of the people I sought to engage in conversation and therefore, I would have to do 
something to remedy this deterrent to participation. Therefore, I began to outline the 
topics that I thought most relevant to the background information for understanding 
the historical context of the Anti-Federalists, for the purpose of making a few audio 
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recordings that would help give the potential participants of my project, the 
background information that would help them feel more comfortable speaking about 
topics related to the Anti-Federalists, without themselves having to spend the time to 
do their own research, something that was necessary since I was asking them to do 
me the favor of participating. 
At the same time as I observed the hesitancy on the part of participants, due to 
lack of comfort speaking to an unknown public audience about an unfamiliar topic, 
the other impediment that I encountered was that many people were having difficulty 
accessing my ftrst informal audio-recordings, as not everyone had access to iTunes 
through the iPod product and the server I was using was fairly limiting in terms of the 
monthly download limit�. Because my own primary use of the iPod product was a 
way of consuming intellectually stimulating audio content while performing manuel 
tasks and exercising, I still intended to produce mobile audio content, yet it was 
becoming clear that YouTube was a much more accessible forum by which people 
could access the potential content that I would be producing, however, ifl was going 
to produce videos, my project's vision had to revised and expanded to include the 
skills ofvideo production. 
The ftrst few "introductory" videos I eventually produced, served to be an 
excellent learning experience in how to produce video content. It was also 
immediately obvious, after my first few videos were produced, that video on YouTube 
generated far more interest in my project than the audio podcast and with only a small 
amount of self-promotion, the views on You Tube, greatly exceeded the iTunes 
downloads. While I probably would have guessed that video would have a greater 
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positive reception, I had never expected the actual disparity in popularity to be so 
extreme. I created a YouTube channel by registering for a YouTube account and 
because this was early on in the process I had named this YouTube channel 
"AntiFederalistTheory". If l had the chance to do it over again, I would have 
standardized the name of the YouTube channel early on as "AntiFederalistProject", as 
"The Anti-Federalist Project " is the name that 'stuck' in the memory of most people; 
understandably, a greater skill in business marketing techniques would have been 
useful in the promotion and research of potential 'market penetration' and 'brand 
testing'. 
The web address for the YouTube channel "AntiFederalistTheory" may be 
accessed here: 
http://www. voutube. com/user/ AntiFederalistTheory 
While all of the videos I have produced for this project, may be found on the 
You Tube channel and I will provide links to each of the videos individually; perhaps 
the easiest way to access all of the videos in one place may be a blog I created for this 
project, which may be accessed at: 
https://antifederalistideology. wordpress.com/ 
In the first video I produced, I attempted to provide potential participants of 
the project, an idea of what I envisioned for the purposes and goals of the project and 
invite them to participate. At this stage, I was still experimenting with inserting titles 
on the top layer of the video and eventually was able to add links to the video through 
the YouTube editor, to link the video to the blog I was using to bring all my videos 
together. This first video may be accessed here: 
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http://voutu.be/(Ot-q6IaZUs [The Anti-Federalist Project Video 1 introduction] 
The second video I produced, was centered around the Articles of 
Confederation. In my understanding of the context for the Federalist and Anti­
Federalist debates, understanding the Articles of Confederation is critical for seeing 
the proposal of the Constitution in the context of an alternative to the Articles of 
Confederation. It was important, therefore, to demonstrate the perceived weaknesses 
of the Articles of Confederation, to understand what the Constitution was intended to 
remedy. In this video I was able to fully utilize video titles as well as make my video 
narration imprint smaller, while displaying an image file at the same time. The 
introductory video I produced on the Articles of Confederation may be accessed here: 
http://youtu.be/YNJJcRWCE2U [The Anti-Federalist Project Video 2 
ArticlesojConfederation] 
The next video I produced was on Shay's Rebellion because in my own 
historical interpretation, it was not mere political theory that impelled the 
Constitutional Convention, but the fears and anxieties associated with the ideas and 
causes of Shay's rebellion were important factors motivating the Constitutional 
Convention. I introduced the primary source quotations from Plough Jogger and 
Henry Knox as representative of the two different world-views, Plough Jogger 
representing the perspective of the protesters surrounding Shay, and Henry Knox, 
representing the conservative opinion that feared a social and political upheaval, 
which may have instigated the perceived need for a reconsideration of the Articles of 
Confederation. The video I had produced on Shay's Rebellion may be accessed here: 
httv:/lyoutu.be/QDVNh4FGu Y [The Anti-Federalist Project Video 3 Shaysrebellion] 
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In the next video, I took on the subject of the Constitutional Convention. This 
was the last of the 'introductory' videos that I was producing in order to provide the 
potential participants to my project, the background information they would need to 
feel comfortable discussing the issues in my research. In this video, I wanted to 
capture the essence of the Constitutional Convention as it is very relevant to the 
Federalist and Anti-Federalist debates, without getting too bogged down, in the very 
interesting but extraneous details. I derived much satisfaction to credit Gordon Lloyd 
for all his great work on the teachingamericanhistory.org site, as it was of much value 
to my research in producing the videos as many of the primary sources were easily 
accessible; and by referring my audience to his site, they could fortify the necessarily 
abbreviated treatment I was able to give the Constitutional Convention. The video I 
produced on the Constitutional Convention may be accessed here: 
http://youtu.be/nlS47Huib40 [The Anti-Federalist Project Video 4 
Constitutionalconvention ] 
With tpe 'introductory' videos complete, and my video production skills 
modestly established, the next three videos I produced concerned my personal 
research and thesis concerning the Anti-Federalists. The first video in this series was 
my video concerning the objections of the Anti-Federalists to the Constitution 
proposed by the Convention. I felt that this was important because the most 
important hurdle for understanding the Anti-Federalists, is to think of them as having 
reasonable objections to the Constitution; a Constitution which is assumed by so 
many, to be manifestly sound and proven and perhaps by some to be unquestionably 
sacred. My goal for this video was to invoke a certain amount of historical empathy 
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for the Anti-Federalists; that they had reasonable objections to a system, that for them 
was unproven and potentially dangerous. The video I have produced on the 
objections to the Constitution by the Anti-Federalists, can be accessed here: 
http://youtu.beNYs8wFfTmVO [The Anti-Federalist Project Video 5 
Antifederalistobjections] 
The second video which I produced to summarize the thesis of my research, 
was on the subject ofNatural Rights. It was the ethical theory ofNatural Rights 
which some of the Anti-Federalists appealed to, which permitted the essential insight 
of my thesis; that the Anti-Federalists fundamentally appealed to the ethical theory of 
Natural Rights as expressed in John Locke, and that the Federalists fundamentally 
appealed to the political economy ofThomas Hobbes. The purpose of this video was 
to explain the history, ethical importance and philosophic foundation of a Natural 
Rights theory and then to connect that theory with the recorded Anti-Federalist 
sources. The video I have produced on the theory ofNatural Rights, may be accessed 
here: 
http://youtu.be/Kr0(-Koeh08 [The Anti-Federalist Project Video 6: 
Natura!Rights.mov] 
In the last video which summarizes my research, I attempt to make my 
primary research thesis explicit; that the Anti-Federalists were confounded in their 
argumentation by their acceptance of contradictory philosophical assertions, which 
caused the difficulty of discerning the essence of the Anti-Federalist contention by 
previous historians, who had assumed that the Anti-Federalists were ideologically 
consistent. I argue that the Anti-Federalists had in futility, attempted to reconcile their 
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historical traditions of political power-structures with the ideological import ofthe 
theory ofNatural Rights, which cannot tolerate coercive power-structures that may 
violate the rights of individuals. 170 The video where I argue for the Anti-Federalist 
contradiction, may be accessed here: 
http://youtu.be/hUvznzBhXJw [The Anti-Federalist Project Video 7: Reconciling 
Contradictions] 
After the video on the Anti-Federalist contradiction, I determined that one 
more video was necessary to act as a capstone for the videos I had produced thus far. 
I wanted to explain the insights into the theory of history that I had developed during 
my research. This last monologue would be the stepping stone which led to my essay 
on the praxeological and Natural Rights implications for the theory of history and 
pedagogy. The video I have produced describing my reflections on the research I had 
conducted on the subject of the Anti-Federalists, may be accessed here: 
http://youtu.be/Jbq7=GOjjTE [Anti-Federalist Project Video 8 Reflections on History] 
After producing these video monologues, I had sent out invitations to 
individuals who had previously expressed interest in the participating in the project, 
as well as to many others that might provide unique insight for the topic. The most 
significant difficulty for getting people to participate was that the technological hurdle 
of interested persons having in their possession, the technical equipment (computer, 
webcam & microphone) necessary, that I could record the video and audio from both 
170 I also discussed what I saw as the essential Federalist contradiction; which was an implicit lack of 
faith in the nature of humanity, which required the external controls on individuals and yet to 
entrust those controls into the hands of other individuals and have faith that their integrity would be 
sufficient that they would not succumb to their own human natures, which was thought to be so 
dangerous as to require the controls. This contradiction or irresolvable circular reasoning, violates 
the second ethical premise discussed in, "Reflections on Researching the Anti-Federalists: 
Praxeological and Natural Rights Implications for the Theory of History and Pedagogy" by Author 
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of our cameras simultaneously. In any event, though I had many people who 
expressed interest in participating and discussing my project, I was only able to 
secure a handful of interviews but in the whole, I am pleased with the outcome of the 
discussions. Those that kindly offered to participate, each brought different views 
and perspectives to the discussion that I greatly appreciated. If it were not for the 
discussions I had with project participants, I am uncertain, I would have, on my own 
accord, been able to develop the three fundamental premises for the Natural Rights 
theory. It was actually the objections to my thesis, that were the most useful, as these 
forced me to think more deeply about the philosophic implications and foundations of 
the Natural Rights theory. The videos that I had produced as a result of my 
conversations with various participants may be accessed here: 
http://voutu.be/SOj3DlT30q8 [Interview with Jonathan List on the Anti-Federalist 
Project] 
http://youtu. be/G4yVoOI5ig4 [Matthew Ochs Interview on the Anti-Federalist Project 
(improved)] 
httv:/lyoutu.be/ YFo VOEKztA [Interview with Chris Beyrle on the Anti-Federalist 
Project] 
After producing the discussion/interview videos, which required a whole new 
set of video editing skills, I decided to embark on another monologue in response to 
my monitoring of the social media site, Twitter. Nearly every Twitter submission is a 
public broadcast and those submissions may be searched. After the few weeks of 
monitoring Twitter to try to entice new participants to discuss my research, I 
determined that much of the interest in the Anti-Federalists came from middle and 
105 
high school students who had been assigned a project to investigate the Anti­
Federalists, usually in the context of their debates with the Federalists. Since my 
previous videos were not explicitly designed for the middle and high school students 
(though certainly the first five 'introductory' videos have much relevance for 
secondary education applications), I determined to produce a video that might provide 
some value to those middle and high school students in their studies. This video 
resulted in a kind of summation of my previous videos for the purposes to describe 
the Federalist and Anti-Federalist debates in a video of just under eighteen minutes. 
The video I had produced for secondary education students, may be accessed here: 
http://youtu.be/0Xmlp5PP2Ec [Federalist/Anti-Federalist Compare & Contrast: Anti­
Federalist Project] 
While mulling over the ideas that I wanted to express in my reflections essay, 
I decided to attempt to produce a few videos while on my daily constitutional 
exercise. I am not sure of the value ofthis kind of mental cogitation which is usually 
kept private to one's own mind before it ready for more formal expression, but I 
thought it might be interesting to record my ideas that were coming into focus for the 
essay I was anticipating. These videos may be accessed here: 
http://voutu. be/7YzGOvBNZWQ Talking about the Three Premises for a Natural Rights 
Theory - Part 1 
httv://youtu. be!EFCRC6DDCTw Talking about the Three Premises for a Natural Rights 
Theory - Part 2 
http://youtu. be/AJkOsSJ hOvA Talking about the Three Premises for a Natural Rights Theory ­
Part 3 
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In the case of all of the videos, I was able to strip the audio from the video and 
use that audio to produce a Podcast, as was the original intent of the project but 
clearly, the initial inception of the project had become one that was primarily focused 
on the visual/video component and I think that this additional challenge greatly 
enhances the value of the endeavor. In the podcast listing, there is an additional 
interview that I conducted with a contact from Twitter (Jacob Johnson), for which I 
did not have a video source. The podcasts may be downloaded using iTunes, under 
the heading of "The Anti-Federalist Project" or it may be directly accessed here: 
http://antifederalistproject.podomatic.com/ 
Overall, I am very satisfied with the results of my research dissemination. I 
have a whole new respect for those Podcasters that are able to produce an hour of 
content every day as for anything approaching professional editing (and my videos in 
no way approach this level of expertise), requires several times more time than the act 
of recording itself (which can require several 'takes' in order not to fumble over your 
own words) . Even with the hours spent preparing to record the video by outlining 
topics to be discussed, scripting important ideas, checking all the factual claims, 
recording the video (generally with several takes) and then editing the video to make 
the monologue narration interesting, was a considerable task for someone would had 
never made the attempt previously; yet now that I have developed a modest ability to 
do so, I have already produced several videos for my personal blog on topics of 
personal interest. 
I really like the accessibility that this approach to publication gives to tpe 
creator of content. Few formats have the opportunity or potential to reach so many 
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unique users, however, time being what it is, if your content is not interesting or 
accessible, few people will spend the time to consume your content. As of the time of 
this writing, my YouTube videos for this project have been viewed in more than six 
hundred instances, with my most viewed video, receiving one hundred and forty one 
'views'. Even so, some of my videos have received less than twenty 'views' and I 
have found that the number of views, is often directly correlated with my own efforts 
to promote my videos within social networking vehicles such as Twitter and 
Google+. I have also found that for most people, viewing my videos as they are 
embedded into the HTML code of my blog, is more accessible than You Tube's actual 
site, when trying to view more than a single video with a single link. 
Publication or dissemination of research to You Tube or other blog format is 
the unique prospect for audience response; YouTube users can not only comment on 
my videos, they can produce their own video responses to my videos. YouTube users 
also have the ability to press a 'like' and 'dislike' button on the uploaded videos. Other 
than the more intimate public speaking engagements, there are few platforms in 
which you could have such richness in audience interaction. This interaction is 
further deepened by the time-factor involved with this particular form of research 
dissemination, as the videos, theoretically remain available indefinitely and are 
continually available for interested persons searching for the relevant terms related to 
my content. With many people increasingly having mobile phones and devices 
wirelessly connected to the internet, dissemination of research via You Tube or internet 
publication has the potential for more mobility than previously internet submission 
has had and while paper printing has had this advantage for quite some time, the 
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ability to consume content in an auditory fashion, allows people to consume research 
while attending to more important visual tasks (i.e. driving). 
The implementation of social-networking and YouTube video-sharing websites 
to communicate information is often referred to as "Web 2.0" to reflect the change of 
moving to generally text-based web content to multi-media and socially interactive 
content. As Albert Harris and Alan Rea point out, "Web 2.0 and virtual world 
technologies are here to stay. Today, our students come to our classroom with a 
presence on Facebook, the latest concert as a podcast on their MP3 player, and 
experience playing games in virtual worlds. In some respects, students are more tech-
savvy than their . . .  professors." 17 1  Students are already coming to the classroom 
initiated in these technologies and have adapted the techniques to answer questions 
posed by intensely driven form of inquiry-based and learner-directed learning. When 
a student discovers a topic of interest and they use a search query to investigate 
further, they select relevant information from the query search results and if they then 
respond to that information with their own unique synthesis on social-networking 
sites, they may already be implementing all of the relevant dimension of learning, 
advocated for by Robert Marzano and Debra Pickering. 172 
Whether it is a social networking site like Facebook, a video stream delivered 
via YouTube, or collaborative discussion and document sharing via Google 
Apps, more people are using Web 2.0 and virtual world technologies in the 
classroom to communicate, express ideas, and form relationships centered 
around topical interests. Virtual Worlds immerse participants even deeper in 
technological realms rife with interaction. Instead of simply building 
information, people create entire communities comprised of self-built worlds 
171  Albert L. Harris & Alan Rea (2009) "Web 2.0 and Virtual World Technologies: A Growing Impact 
on IS Education" Journal of information Systems Education vol 20(2) 1 37. 
172 Robert J. Marzano & Debra J. Pickering ( 1 997) Dimensions of Learning (Aurora CO: McREL). 
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and avatars centered around common interests, learning, or socialization in 
order to promote information exchange. 173 
Teachers and professors are also using these technologies in the classroom. 
As I am typing these very words on Saturday, December 3rd, 201 1 ,  I am receiving 
"Tweets" from the National Council of Social Studies conference in Washington 
D.C. about social studies teachers interested in using Twitter in their classrooms. The 
University of California at Berkeley was one of the first universities to start their own 
official YouTube channel, with the University of Southern California, the University 
ofNew South Wales and Vanderbilt University soon following. 174 Some of Berkeley's 
YouTube video lectures are generating over 100,000 views each; "Professors in a 
sense are rock stars," Mr. Hochman concludes, "We're getting as many hits as you 
would fmd with some of the big media players." 175 
Peter Duffy describes the Web 2.0 learning experience as, 
"a ubiquitous user-centric, user-content generated and user-guided 
experience . . .  [which has] collaborative and (co)creative purposes as well as 
for the critical assessment, evaluation and personalization of information . . .  
provid[ing] educators with many possibilities for engaging students in 
desirable practices such as collaborative content creation, peer assessment and 
motivation of students through innovative use of media. These can be used in 
the development of authentic learning tasks and enhance the learning 
experience." 176 
173 Albert L. Harris & Alan Rea (2009) "Web 2.0 and Virtual World Technologies: A Growing Impact 
on IS Education" Journal of information Systems Education vol 20(2) 1 37. 
174 Jeffrey R. Young (2008) "YouTube Professors: Scholars as Online Video Stars" 
(Accessed at confluence.media.berkeley.edu/confluence/download/attachments/1 3 1 1 0961 /2008-01 -
28 _ YouTube+Professors+-+Scholars+as+Online+ Video+Stars. pdf on I 2/ I I I 0 I I  : The Chronicle of 
Higher Education) 
175 ibid. " . . .  colleges were already offering lecture videos on their own Web sites or on Apple's iTunes 
U, an educational section of the iTunes Store." 
176 Peter Duffy (20 I 0) Engaging the YouTube Google-Eyed Generation: Strategies for Using Web 2.0 
in Teaching and Learning (Hong Kong: The Hong Kong Poliytechnic University) 
http://books.google.com/books? 
hl=en&lr=&id=spo9X I 6qn30C&oi=fnd&pg=PA I 73&dq=education+video+ YouTube&ots=rtLCFXgX 
Dt&sig=2iTOZwjFpHT691UcE62-DnOmn 4#v=onepage&q=education%20video 
%20YouTube&:t=false 
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Janice Agazio and Kathleen Buckley are using are using YouTube video-
sharing technology in their classrooms of nursing students to, " .. .illustrate theoretical 
content, involve students, and inspire innovative teaching methods . . .  " as well as, 
" . . .  stimulate student discussions, share information, and create a learning community. 
YouTube stimulates active learning and brings new relevance and applications to 
nursing curriculum."177 This would seem to give credence to the possibilities of online 
video to promote and simulate the use of procedural knowledge as well as declarative 
knowledge as Marzano had advocated. 1 78 Burke & Snyder (2008) fmds that the, "use 
of innovative video technology resources such as YouTube can be integrated to 
provide relevant and targeted information to supplement college course content, 
create a sense of 'classroom community,' and enrich the learning environment for all 
students--both younger and older"179 There are some possible drawbacks to the 
inclusion ofYouTube video content to the learning experience however; Knight 
(2006) describes his and other professors experience with publishing their lectures to 
YouTube as, "a great tool with which to supplement classroom lectures" but that it 
had the deleterious effect of decreasing student attendance to the classroom 
lectures. 1 80 
177 Janice Agazio & Kathleen Buckley (2009) "An Untapped Resource: Using YouTube in Nursing 
Education" Nurse Educator: January/February vol. 34( 1 )  23-28. 
1 78 Robert J .  Marzano & Debra J. Pickering ( 1 997) Dimensions of Learning (Aurora CO: McREL). 
J 1 3. 
179 Sloane C. Burke & Shonna L. Snyder (2008) YouTube: An Innovative Learning Resource for 
College Health Education Courses. (Reston VA: International Electronic Journal of Health 
Education) p39-46. Accessed at: http://eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/search/detailmini .jsp? 
nfpb=true& &ERICExtSearch SearchValue O=EJ798652&ERICExtSearch SearchType O=no& 
accno=EJ798652 on 1 2-0 1 -20 1 1 .  
180 R. Knight (2006) "Podcast pedagogy divides opinion at U S  universities" (Accessed at 
http://ebusinessfomm.com/index.asp?doc id=8 1 52&layout=rich story on May 9'\ 2009) as 
referenced in Albert L. Harris & Alan Rea "Web 2.0 and Virtural World Technologies: A Growing 
Impact on IS Education" Journal of Information Systems Education vol . 20 (2) Accessed at: 
1 1 1  
Overall, the most intriguing idea that I keep pondering is the semi-permanence 
of the videos that I have produced on the subject of the Anti-Federalists will likely 
still be available and easily accessible for an indefinite period of time and the ability 
of the audience of my videos interacting in the future, producing their own videos in 
response to mine, and videos in response to those responses, long after I have moved 
on to other subjects, continually serves to fascinate. Perhaps more than the actual 
content of the Anti-Federalists themselves, I am very pleased with the results of my 
introduction to the skills necessary to disseminate and distribute my own ideas to a 
wider audience using the techniques of video production and YouTube. I only regret 
that I had not made the attempt to do so sooner. My hope is for the videos that I have 
produced is that they will be of some assistance to social studies teachers in preparing 
lessons on the Federalist/Anti-Federalist debates, and that they will be moved through 
my research to have some greater historical empathy and understanding for those 
Anti-Federalists, who may have been seen to have suffered somewhat in the political 
arena, but who may have had greater success in the arena of ideology. 
http://leamingtechworld .com/Documents!Virtual%20World%20Technologies.pdf on 1 2/0 1 /201 1 . 
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Table 1 :  Tabled Historiography 
Anti-Federalist Federalists 
Description & Description & 
Assignment Assignment 
Ratification to Treated Anti-Federalists Representing the 
Civil War with restraint and success of the silence Constitution 
Objectors to the The cherished "fore-
Post-Civil War Constitution. fathers" that brought 
to 1913 forth the Constitution, "conceived in 
liberty . . .  " 
Democratic and Commercial and 
Agrarian. Holders of 0 ligarchical. 
Realty: Landed Represented 
Property and debtor- "Personalty", "money, 
Beard (1913) farmers public securities, manufactures, and trade 
and shipping"181 
Interested in economic 
stability; generally east 
coast urban areas. 
Progressive Democratic levelers; Introduced several 
Historians Concerned with the aristocratic features in 
(1890's - interests of the People; the federal system; 
1960's) Rustic Elitist, Merchant-Capitalists 
Protection from Confident in human 
potentially despotic nature and the virtue of 
government by local citizens in a future 
Kenyon (1955) and state government. republic; failing this 
Not the democrats that providing for checks 
Beard portrayed. against abuses of 
power. 
Very similar in values Very similar in values 
Consensus and principles to the and principles to the 
Historians Federalists, differing Anti-Federalists , only in specific differing only in 
applications specific applications 
Storing (1981) Individual liberty Wanted a strong 
protected by small local national government. 
government, 
18 1  Beard, Economic interpretation of the Constitution, 291 ,  324, 325. 
Evaluation of the Anti-
Federalists 
Unpopular and Ignored. 
To be treated with 
distain and contempt as 
the objectors ofthe 
Constitution that was 
ordained and sacred. 
Keepers of the radical 
Revolutionary Spirit of 
the War for 
Independence 
Advocates for the 
people and defenders of 
democracy against the 
aristocratic Federalists 
Short-sighted and 
fearful of potential 
abuses of power 
Held the weaker 
argument. Unable to 
rectify internal 
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representative 
representation, anti-
aristocratic, 
"Country" Opposition 
Hutson (1981) to the exercise of governmental power 
Concerned with public 
happiness, local 
communities and state 
Duncan (1994) sovereignty 
!Hl Duncan, "Men of a Different Faith": 4 1 5 . 
"Court" Proponents of 
centralized government 
Nationalist interested in 
the centralization of 
power for the general 
good. 
inconsistencies. Valued 
contrary principles that 
they were ultimately 
unable to reconcile. 
Feared the power of 
government. Inheritors 
ofWhiggish "jealousy" 
of government 
The Anti-Federalists 
were "Men of a 
Different Faith" not to 
be extolled nor 
condemned but that, 
"their loss ultimately 
has been our loss as 
wel1."182 
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Appendix: 
"Yet, I confess, I see great difficulty of drawing forth a good representation. What, 
for example, will be the inducements for gentlemen of fortune and abilities to leave 
their houses and business to attend annually and long? It cannot be the wages; for 
these, I presume, must be small. Will not the power, therefore, be thrown into the 
hands of the demagogue, or middling politician - who, for the sake of a small 
stipend, and the hopes of advancement, will offer himself as a candidate, and the real 
men of weight and influence, by remaining at home, add strength to the state 
governments? I am at a loss to know what must be done. I despair that a republican 
form of government can remove the difficulties. Whatever may be my opinion, I 
would hold it, however, unwise to change that form of government. I believe the 
British government forms the best model the world ever produced; and such has been 
its progress in the minds of the many, that the truth gradually gains ground. This 
government has for its object public strength and individual security. It is said with 
us to be unattainable. If it was once formed, it would maintain itself. All 
communities divide themselves into the few and the many. The first are the rich and 
well born, the other the mass of the people. The voice of the people has been said to 
be the voice of God; and, however generally this maxim has been quoted and 
believed, it is not true in fact. The people are turbulent and changing; they seldom 
judge or determine right. Give, therefore, to the first class a distinct, permanent share 
in the government. They will check the unsteadiness of the second; and, as they 
cannot receive any advantage by a change, they therefore will ever maintain good 
government. Can a democratic assembly, who annually revolve in the mass of the 
people, be supposed steadily to pursue the public good? Nothing but a permanent 
body can check the imprudence of democracy. Their turbulent and uncontrollable 
disposition requires checks. The Senate of New York, although chosen for four years, 
we have found to be inefficient. ·Will, on the Virginia plan, a continuance of seven 
years do it? It is admitted that you cannot have a good executive upon a democratic 
plan. See the excellency of the British executive. He is placed above temptation -
he can have no distinct interests from the public welfare. Nothing short of such an 
executive can be efficient. The weak side of a republican government is the danger of 
foreign influence. This is unavoidable, unless it is so constructed as to bring forward 
its first characters in its support. I am therefore for a general government, yet would 
wish to go the full length of republican principles." 
-Alexander Hamilton 
[Found in: Jonathan Elliot, The debates in the several state conventions on the 
adoption of the federal Constitution, as recommended by the general 
convention at Philadelphia, in 1 787. paragraph 3205. Accessed from 
http://oll.l ibertyfund.org/title/ l 9051 1 1 2205 on 2009-4- 1 6  ] 
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"It is natural for a republic to have only a small territory; otherwise it cannot long 
subsist. In an extensive republic there are men of large fortunes, and consequently of 
less moderation; there are trusts too considerable to be placed in any single subject; 
he has interests of his own; he soon begins to think that he may be happy and 
glorious, by oppressing his fellow-citizens; and that he may raise himself to grandeur 
on the ruins of his country. In an extensive republic the public good is sacrificed to a 
thousand private views; it is subordinate to exceptions, and depends on accidents. In a 
small one, the interest of the public is more obvious, better understood, and more 
within the reach of every citizen; abuses have less extent, and, of course, are less 
protected." 
- Charles Louis de Secondat 
[Found in: Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu. 1 777. The Complete 
Works of M de Montesquieu (London: T. Evans,), 4 vols. Vol. 1 .  Chapter: 
CHAP. XVI. : Distinctive Properties of a Republic. Accessed from 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/83717 1 3 1 0/1 688750 on 201 1 - 12- 10] 
"In these sentiments, Sir, I agree to this Constitution with all its faults, if they 
are such; because I think a general Government necessary for us, and there is no form 
of Government but what may be a blessing to the people if well administered, and 
believe farther that this is likely to be well administered for a course of years, and can 
only end in Despotism, as other forms have done before it, when the people shall 
become so corrupted as to need despotic Government, being incapable of any other. I 
doubt too whether any other Convention we can obtain may be able to make a better 
Constitution. For when you assemble a number of men to have the advantage of their 
joint wisdom, you inevitably assemble with those men, all their prejudices, their 
passions, their errors of opinion, their local interests, and their selfish views. From 
such an Assembly can a perfect production be expected? It therefore astonishes me, 
Sir, to find this system approaching so near to perfection as it does; and I think it will 
astonish our enemies, who are waiting with confidence to hear that our councils are 
confounded like those of the Builders of Babel; and that our States are on the point of 
separation, only to meet hereafter for the purpose of cutting one another's throats. 
Thus I consent, Sir, to this Constitution because I expect no better, and because I am 
not sure, that it is not the best. The opinions I have had of its errors, I sacrifice to the 
public good - I have never whispered a syllable of them abroad - Within these 
walls they were born, and here they shall die - If every one of us in returning to our 
Constituents were to report the objections he has had to it, and endeavor to gain 
partizans in support of them, we might prevent its being generally received, and 
thereby lose all the salutary effects & great advantages resulting naturally in our favor 
among foreign Nations as well as among ourselves, from our real or apparent 
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:unanimity. Much of the strength & efficiency of any Government in procuring and 
securing happiness to the people, depends. on opinion, on the general opinion of the 
goodness ofthe Government, as well as well as of the wisdom and integrity of its 
Governors. I hope therefore that for our own sakes as a part of the people, and for the 
sake of posterity, we shall act heartily and unanimously in recommending this 
Constitution (if approved by Congress & confirmed by the Conventions) wherever 
our influence may extend, and tum our future thoughts & endeavors to the means of 
having it well administered.that in Kenyon's view of the later success of the national 
government in refraining from such abuses, turned out to be unwarranted. 
-Benjamin Franklin 
[Found in: Max Farrand, ed . .  1 9 1 1 .  The Records of the Federal Convention of 1 787. 
New Haven: Yale University Press. vol. 2 .  Chapter: MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 
1 7, 1 787. Accessed from http:/ /oll.libertyfund.org/title/1 786/96200/2 1 50846 
on 2009-04-1 6.] 
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